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In today's high-tech business and trade arena, information is
simultaneously a resource, a raw material, and a commodity. Since
the turn of the century, the world demand for information has in-
creased dramatically. To meet this demand, or in the alternative,
driven by it, technological changes have occurred in this century
on a heretofore unknown scale. This proliferation of new technolo-
gies has had a profound effect on both international trade policies
and international politics, and has given rise to a whole new indus-
try called Information Services.
The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in the growth of
internationally-operated computer communication systems and
data processing services. These systems process and transmit data
from terminals to computers, or between computers, in networks
that may span several countries. This new technological industry
of high speed computer communication has not only touched, but
has revolutionized fields concerned with global telephone and tele-
vision services, military operations, banking and international com-
merce, tourism, management of multinational businesses, and dis-
semination of scientific data.2 Rapid data communication is now
essential for the continued operation and management of many of
these fields.
The worldwide availability of computer communications and
information services has created a trade in these services, complete
with all the traditional aspects of an international industry, such
as competition between foreign vendors, taxes and duties, and reg-
ulations that appear to favor domestic vendors. 3 In addition, it has
created a host of new policy issues and a new esoteric terminology
of its own. A discussion of these policies focuses on the issue of
Transborder Data Flow.
Transborder Data Flow (TDF) has been defined as "the elec-
tronic transmission of computer-generated and machine-readable
digital data between countries."4 This flow of digital data usually
1. See Turn, Privacy Protection and Security in Transnational Data Processing Sys-
tems, 16 STAN. J. INT'rL L. 67 (1980).
2. See Novotny, Transborder Data Flows and International Law; A Framework for
Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 141, 142 (1980).
3. See Turn, supra note 1, at 68.
4. Seidman, Transborder Data Flow: Regulation of International Information Flow
and the Brazilian Example, 1 JL TECH- 31, 82 (1985).
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occurs via satellite, microwave, cable, or conventional radio, where
each mode can transport voice, image, character, and other sym-
bols in digital bit streams.5 The problems surrounding TDF are a
result of the merger of computer and telecommunication technolo-
gies.0 Those problems increasingly involve political conflicts con-
cerning issues of access, use, and control of TDF. Indeed, some so-
cial commentators suggest that "we are experiencing a revolution
every bit as significant as that of the industrial era."7
Primary users of TDF include governments and multinational
corporations (MNCs). In order to deal competitively in informa-
tion technology, it is necessary to have competitive equipment,
such as state-of-the-art computer 'technology. For this reason,
there is a need to examine TDF as it relates to each user's attitude
toward the commodity of information as well as the way in which
that information relates to each user's concept of the technology
involved. In this way, it is possible to identify and evaluate the
major points of conflict and of cooperation.
A new subgroup of information services has developed as a re-
sult of ongoing developments in the field of micro-electronics.'
This development is concerned with data industries, which differ
from traditional information industries in that they use digital
data technologies. Such technologies are viewed as the core of both
the data-goods industries and the data-services industries.9 Partly
as a result of these developments, the information sector is con-
tributing increasingly to the gross domestic product (GDP) of
many developing countries such as Brazil. 10
Together, the Third World countries occupy only a tiny por-
tion of the world market in computer potential; generous estimates
place it at between 5% and 7% of the total.1 Even though Latin
America accounts for 60% of the mass media in the Third World,
there exists an enormous gap in the existing potential of Third
5. See id.
6. Fishman, Introduction to Transborder Data Flows, 16 STAN. J. INTSL L. 1. 2 (1980).
In the summer of 1980, the Stanford Journal of International Law devoted an entire vol-
ume to the subject of transborder data flow. In this collection, the authors discuss various
international political concerns facing TDF. Id. See supra notes 1-2-
7. Id. at 3.
. K.P. SAUVANT, TRADE ANn FonsrcN DIRECr INVESTMN i mN DATA SFPRvn'.Fs 7 (1984).
9. Id.
10. Id.
1. A. MATTELART & -I. ScHMUCLSR, COMMUNICATION AND INVORMATION TECHNOLOCIES:
FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR LATIN AMERICA 65 (1985) [hereinafter FaEEDOM OF CHOICE].
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World countries as compared to more industrialized countries,
such as the United States. Brazil, the most advanced of the Third
World countries in the information business, occupied sixteenth
place in 1978 with $194 million dollars in computer and office
equipment imports.2 In comparison, the United States ranked
first, importing $1,962 million dollars in equipment.1 3 In January
1981, existing computers in developing countries represented 5.7%
of the world total in volume and 4.2% in value. 14 Of this, Latin
America accounted for 54 % of the computer resources of the Third
World, and Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela together possessed 77%
of the Latin American total.'0
The development of new technology in computers and data
processing stimulates development of computer software and infor-
mation services. Recently, Brazil has sought to deal with many of
the computer software issues facing that country by drafting new
software protection legislation. This note examines that proposed
software legislation as it relates to (1) Brazil's response to the sov-
ereignty issues surrounding Informatics, the Brazilian policy of
protectionism of digitally-based computer and electronic equip-
ment;6 (2) the United States' response to the Informatics policy
conflict between sovereignty and the free flow of information; and
(3) possible solutions to the problems facing U.S. multinational
corporations which have trade or business involvement with com-
puter technology in Brazil.
Since 1980, a shift in TDF policy has occurred in many na-
tions, including Brazil. The concern for personal data protection
and individual privacy, which was prevalent until 1980, has dwin-
dled as interest in business and transnational communication in-
tensified.17 This note focuses on the tension which exists between a
developing country, such as Brazil, and the United States concern-
12. Id.
13. Id. at 65-6.
14. Id. at 67.
15. Id.
16. "Informatics is a term used in Europe and the Third World to describe the infor-
mation industries of telecommunications and data processing. It refers to data processing
for information services via automatic machines. See Recent Development, Brazilian Com-
puter Import Restrictions: Technological Independence and Commercial Reality, 17 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 619 (1985) (authored by Anne Piorkowski) [hereinafter Recent Develop-
ment]; See also Seidman, supra note 4.
17. See id. at 45 (citing Gassman, The Changing Nature of Transborder Data Flows, in




ing the protection of technological information by focusing on the
events surrounding Brazil's announcement in 1984 of legislation
regulating its market for computer products.
II. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW AND THE BRAZILIAN
INFORMATICS LAW
On October 29, 1984, despite "sharp objections from the
United States and other countries,"' 8 the National Congress of
Brazil passed a new Informatics law 9 which reserved its "domestic
market for mini- and microcomputers to 1,006 Brazilian-owned
companies for eight years. "29 While most developing countries en-
courage the influx of foreign technology, Brazil is taking a different
approach.2 1 Once Brazil determined that technological indepen-
dence was necessary for economic and military security, it "im-
posed a policy of protectionism intended to foster its own domestic
informatics industry. ' 22 This protectionist policy is referred to as a
"reserved market"; it serves to encourage Brazil's technological in-
dustry by giving preferential treatment to its domestic enterprises.
Specifically, the Informatics legislation provides the basic legal
framework for the development of a domestic computer industry
by offering major financial incentives to Brazilian firms and by al-
lowing the Brazilian government to impose temporary restrictions,
at any time, on "production, sale, importation, and exportation of
computers and related products.12 3 In addition, foreign firms sell-
ing computer equipment and support services in Brazil are re-
quired to disclose, to a Brazilian regulatory agency, all the techni-
cal information Brazil feels is "necessary" to allow interconnection
of their products with those produced by other firms.24 Function-
ally, the Informatics legislation imposes temporary restrictions on
activities such as research; the import, export, manufacture, mar-
18. See Brazil Prepares to Institute New Computer Software Protection Despite U.S-
Protest, I INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 321 (1984).
19. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. COMM. DEP'T DOC., OCL, 1984, subject: Translation of Brazilian
Law No. 7.232, Oct. 29, 1984 (hereinafter INFORMATICS LAW] (on file at the offices of the
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review). See also 25 I.L.M. 808 (1986) (English
translation from the Portuguese by Pinheiro Neto-Advogados, of Brazil).
20. Brazil, Tax: New Informatics Law, INT'L Bus. LAW., Mar. 1985, at 101-03.
21. See Recent Development, supra note 16, at 619.
22. Id.
23. See Brazil's Proposed National Computer Law Would Regulate Imports of Goods,
Services, I INT'L TR AE REP. (BNA) 158 (1984).
24. Id.
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keting and operation of machines, equipment and devices based on
digital techniques are similarly restricted. One commentator de-
scribed Brazil's Informatics law as arguably affecting "any firm
which owns a piece of electronic equipment such as a calculator or
electronic typewriter" because of the law's "broad definition of the
machines which fall within [its] scope.""6
By its terms, the Informatics law imposes temporary restric-
tions on the import and marketing of informatics goods and ser-
vices27 (emphasis added). In Brazil, computers belong to the goods
category, while computer software is in the service category. In-
formatics restrictions generally will not apply to: 1) firms that use
national (Brazilian-developed) technology, provided they do not
take advantage of any government-sponsored financial or benefit
programs,82 or 2) goods which do not depend on the importation of
foreign parts, spares, or components in their production." ' The
marketing of even locally produced informatics goods and services,
25. INFORMATICS LAW, supra note 19, art. 3. See also Recent Development, supra note
16, at 625. The 1984 informatics law was adopted by Brazil to be as all- encompassing as
possible and to retain broad powers in ite administrative bodies. The law was intended to
become the "legal instrument for monitoring the computerization of Brazilian society...;"
its main features include:
(1) Creation of the National Council of Informatics and Automation (CONIN) which was
responsible for elaborating the National Plan for Informatics to be submitted every third
year to the National Congress.
(2) Adoption of restrictions on production, operation, marketing, and importing of technical
goods and services in informatics (i.e., mini- and microcomputers). These restrictions are
temporary and will remain in force until the national companies are consolidated and able
to compete in the international market.
(3) "National companies" arc considered to be those with headquarters in Brazil, and whose
control is permanently, exclusively, and unconditionally in the hands of Brazilian persons or
entities.
(4) Provisions for receiving tax exemptions of up to 100% on imports and industrial prod-
ucts for research and development projects and also for production of goods and services of
informatica to national companies.
(5) Provisions for interested foreign companies to produce their equipment in the informat-
ics export districts located in the north and northeast regions of Brazil; this production
must be destined exclusively for the foreign market.
(6) Fiscal incentives for purchasing shares of national companies linked to informatics.
(7) Creation of the National Informatics Center Foundation to promote scientific and tech-
nological research in informatics; for example, the Special Informatics Fund, created by the
same law.
See Seidman, supra note 4, at 61-62 (citing L Fonseca, High Technology Development in
Brazil (Dec. 1984) (unpublished work on file with the J.L. TEen.)).
26. See Recent Development, supra note 16, at 625. See also Tighter Restrictiorn on
lnformatics Loor in Brazil, Bus. Latin Am., Aug. 15, 1984, at 257, col. 1.
27. INFOR s LAW, supra note 19, art. 9.
28. Id. at art. 9, & 1..
29. Id. at art. 9, I. Ii.
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however, can be restricted domestically whenever Brazil's adminis-
trative agency finds that a monopoly may exist.30 Brazil fears that
if the computer market is supplied solely by American and Japa-
nese firms, for example, there would be no possibility of Brazil de-
veloping its own technology in this area.3 1 Before one can develop
an understanding of Brazil's Informatics legislation and the related
arguments for or against a less drastic import restriction scheme,
however, the background and government policies surrounding the
legislation's passage must first be examined.
A. Laying the Informatics Groundwork
In 1983, it was estimated that Brazil ranked between seventh
and tenth in the world computer market, 2 thus representing an
example of a fairly advanced developing country with a technology
transfer law. Accordingly, in Brazil, the government permits access
to its computer market only for those agreeing to the transfer of
technology. 0 To implement this broad governmental policy, Brazil
has created an extensive regulatory network that initiates guide-
lines and monitors compliance with its informatics policy.
Although the Coordinating Commission for Data Processing
Activities (CAPRE) was established in Brazil in 1972 to "rational-
ize the use of electronic data processing by Government agen-
cies,"34 four years later CAPRE was assigned the task of formulat-
ing an industrial policy for informatics,m and, in order to protect
the informatics industry, it was given some authority over the im-
portation of data processing equipment. 6 Thus, in four years,
CAPRE shifted its objective from being a coordinating agency to
30. Id. at art 10. See also Recent Development, supra note 16, at 625.
31. See supra note 23, at 159.
32, See U.S. Software Protection: Problems of Trade Secret Estoppel Under Interna-
tional and Brazilian Technology Transfer Regimes, 23 COLUM. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 679, 689
(1985) (authored by Joel R. Reidenberg) [hereinafter U.S. Software Protection] (citing rT-
GRE, TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION IN THE BRAZILIAN COMPUTER INDUSTRY 5 (1983)).
33. See supra note 32 (citing Castro, The Computer Industry; Restrictions and Per-
formance Requirements, in HIGH TECHNOLOC INDUSTRIES PROFILES AND OUTLOOKS OP THE
CoMPUTR INDUSTRY 55 (published by the U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, 1983))-
34. See Seidman, supra note 4, at 57 (citing SPECIAL SEcnrrAIAT OF INFORMATION OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL, TRANS-
BORDER DATA F'LOW AND BRAZIL THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORFORATIONS, IMPACTS OF
TRANBBORDBR DATA FLOWS AND Errno'rs OF NATIONAL POLICIES 5-7, at 187 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter BRAZILIAN CASE STUDY].
35. See Seidman, supra note 4, at 57.
36. See BRAZILIAN CASE STUDY, supra note 34.
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being an agency supervising the implementtion of an aggressive in-
dustrial policy. Three years after this transformation, in 1979,
CAPRE was succeeded by the Special Secretariat for Informatics
(SEI), Brazil's "watchdog agency", whose job was to regulate,
among other things, the in-flow of computer technology.3
In 1982, SEI promulgated Normative Act No. 22, which ex-
pressly requires registration of computer programs "made available
to the public in the Brazilian marketplace." 8 Under this regula-
tion, registration with SEI is required for all software "intended
for use... in Brazilian territory,"3 8 and, furthermore, SEI must
approve any "agreements involving computer programs." 40 In addi-
tion to these registration and approval requirements, any software
transfer agreement must be recorded with the National Industrial
Property Institute (INPI), which is the Brazilian Patent and
Trademark Office; this requirement applies to commercial distri-
bution as well as to distribution within a multinational corpora-
tion.4 1 The basis for this regulation is Brazil's desire to outlaw cer-
tain contractual provisions, namely, "restrictions after expiration
of an agreement; restrictions after expiration of industrial property
rights; restrictions on research and development; restrictions on
the access of new technology; and restrictions on distributions or
sales."4 The foregoing contract provisions, which are forbidden by
the SEI, always are requested by the software-supplying party and
are important for maintaining U.S. trade secret protection. This
37. Decree No. 84,067 of Oct. 8, 1979. EEI's authority was greatly expanded over that
of CAPRE, hut the policy objectives remained similar: "to enhance the ability of [Brazilian]
national corporations to manufacture increasingly complex technologies." Seidman, supra
note 4, at 57.
88. Normative Act No. 22 (Dec. 7, 1982), translated in Daniel, Notes from Brazil, 82
PAT. & TRAnnmARK REv. 97, 108-11 (1984) [hereinafter Normative Act No. 22]. The regula-
tions issued by the INPI or the SEI are referrred to as Ares Normatioos, or Normative Acts.
These acts ae not signed by the President of the Republic of Brazil nor by the Minister,
but are signed by the President of INPI, a position comparable to a chairman or director.
Normative Acts differ from legislation and legislative regulations in that they are made by
the INPI, and they can be changed by that agency. Nattier, Brazil, in TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FER: LAWS AND PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERcIA 145, 154 (B. Carl ed. 1980).
39. Normative Act No. 22, supra note 38, art. 1. See also U.S. Software Protection,
supra note 32, at 690.
40. Normative Act No. 22, supra note 38, at art. 5(b).
41. See U.S. Software Protection, supra note 32, at 690.
42. Id. at 690. Restrictions after expiration allow confidentiality requirements to sur-
vive the duration of any licensing or transfer agreement. Restrictions on research and devel-
opment which binder access and distribution are used to guard further the secrecy of the
software. Id. at a. 82.
43. Id. at 691.
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restriction on contractual provisions creates an immediate tension
between Brazil's policy that unpatented technological information
should be freely available to all Brazilians as soon as possible, and
the U.S. corporation's unwillingness to divulge trade secrets.
B. The Brazilian Informatics Regime
1. Overview of the Plan
On September 30, 1985, approximately one year after the new
Informatics legislation was approved by the National Congress of
Brazil, the first National Informatics Plan (Plan) required by this
new legislation was submitted by the National Council of In-
formatics and Automation (CONIN) to the Brazilian Congress.
CONIN was created to control the SEI and is directly responsible
to the President of Brazil.
44
The Plan announced external and internal strategies aimed at
accomplishing three objectives:
(1) increasing economic and political/military autonomy;
(2) increasing economic productivity; and
(3) spreading the benefits of the new informatics policies to the
Brazilian public."
Brazil's external strategy calls for "safeguarding the principles of
national informatics policy" by organizing international coopera-
tion programs to develop new technologies with other developing
countries. Specifically, China, Argentina, Mexico and India are
seen as the most likely sources of cooperation with Brazil.4" Bra-
zil's internal strategy focuses upon four major efforts: 1) diffusing
benefits of informatics through better social services; 2) consolidat-
ing production of goods and services, particularly microelectronics
and software; 3) strengthening research and development efforts in
Brazil; and 4) increasing formation of human resources by upgrad-
ing informative programs. This fourth objective could be attained,
for example, by granting overseas scholarships to Brazilian stu-
dents for doctoral studies where no domestic program is
available. 47
44. See supra note 4, at 63-64. For an overview of the provisions of the 1984 Brazilian
Informatics Law, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 4, at 64.




From the perspective of the U.S. computer industry, U.S.
computer companies have not prospered in Brazil under the in-
formatics regime; in fact, many have been forced to close some
Brazilian plants because of the informatics "national company"
rule.' Furthermore, U.S. companies lost millions of dollars when
they were forced to sell their Brazilian subsidiaries at a fraction of
their investment cost.4 9 Even non-computer related U.S. compa-
nies which rely on electronics in their businesses are having diffi-
culties with the Brazilian policies. For example, "United Press In-
ternational (UPI) has had difficulty obtaining spare parts for its
U.S.-made machines."54 From the perspective of the Brazilian
computer industry, the flip-side of U.S. woes does not look much
brighter. The export prospects for Brazilian computer manufactur-
ers do not look very promising largely because their equipment is
frequently antiquated and is often more expensive. The educa-
tional resources needed to train engineers are also lacking, and
Brazil's lesser-known brands cannot compete with the established
well-known names in the international market.'
In light of the foregoing, one wonders why a developing coun-
try so crinscious of progress would deliberately sabotage its efforts
to compete with new technologies by imposing upon itself such an
inwardly-focused technological trade policy. To begin to answer
this question, one must focus on the problem from the Brazilian
point of view.
2. Brazil's National Sovereignty
The stated purpose of the SEI and INPI in Brazil is to pro-
mote the development of Brazilian trade and industry, but Brazil's
policies and general hostile attitudes toward foreign technology
often operate to the detriment of foreign transferors of technology
and thus indirectly stifle Brazilian development. Specifically, Bra-
48. See Recent Development, neupra note 16, at 635.
49. See id. For example, in 1983 Philco (a consumer electronics subsidiary of Ford Mo-
tor Company) was forced to close a Brazilian plant that had produced silicone chips since
1979 because of an SEI ruling that the reserve market policy applied to semi-conductors.
The plant was sold to Brazilian groups for $9 million-$21 million less than Philco had
invested in the plant over the previous three years. Id. at 636-36.
50. See id. at 636.
51. As of late 1984, Brazilian-made computers cost Brazilians from two to eight times
the price charged on the international market for similar equipment because of high tariffs
placed on foreign components and peripheral equipment in an effort to encourage domestic
production of these computer products. See id. at 632-34.
[Vol. 19:2
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zil's erection of barriers to the free flow of information and tech-
nology are implemented for the purpose of protecting various eco-
nomic, political, and social interests related to the preservation of
national sovereignty,52 but these harriers also serve to stifle the for-
eign investment of technology in Brazil. Indeed, Professor Keith
Rosenn has pointed out that "access to the most modern computer
technology is critical if Brazilian industry is to become competitive
in world markets. Creating monopolies for Brazilian computer
companies may ultimately prove as disastrous to Brazilian devel-
opment as the creation of a government monopoly in oil explora-
tion.'53 By cutting itself off from foreign technology, many critics
argue that "Brazil will relegate its computer industry to the use of
technology which is constantly behind the "state-of-the-art." 4
Brazil's views of national sovereignty, when compared with its
desire to become competitive in a highly technological world mar-
ket would seem to be competing interests; in fact, from the U.S.
point of view it would seem that Brazil is "going about it the
wrong way." The nature of the dilemma facing Brazil may be seen
as a campaign for self-reliance. The success of Brazil's (or any
other developing nation's) drive for advancement in the technolog-
ical world is dependent upon its ability both to acquire and to em-
ploy data processing and telecommunications technologies.5 In an
attempt to promote these technologies, many lesser developed
countries have adopted national informatics plans and policies,
even though the very policies that they adopt to further their de-
velopment actually create barriers to the international flow of in-
formation so vital to their development.
Information is a resource which yields certain economic, politi-
cal, and technological advantages, and for this reason Brazil seeks
to exert complete control over its own information resources and
the advantages flowing therefrom. According to the Brazilian logic,
use of these resources by another country would threaten Brazil's
52. For a discussion of national sovereignty, as it relates to information flow, see
Novotny, supra note 2, at 160-66. See also Eger, The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformat-
ice: An Introduction, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 208, 231-34 (1981).
53. Rosenn, Regulation of Foreign Investment in Brazil: A Critical Analysis, 15 LAW
Am. 307, 364-65 (1983).
54- See Recent Development, supra note 16, at 631.
65. For a discussion of national sovereignty and the ways in which informatics policies
promote economic, social and political development see ][ortnick, International Informa-




national sovereignty by undermining its control.5 7 Brazil fears that
loss of control will result in vulnerability in the areas of equipment
and services, as well as encourage cultural erosion through the in-
troduction of new values and perspectives that may conflict with
those traditionally held in Brazil. The Brazilians are also wary of
overdependence, which they feel could be caused by having to util-
ize foreign data processing and communication services in order to
perform their necessary information-processing functions and then
being forced to buy back this processed information at a higher
price. In fact, as one commentator stated, the lesser-developed
countries such as Brazil "approach informatics problems from the
perspective of information and technology 'have-nots'. Their con-
cerns revolve around their lack of access to both technology and
the world's store of knowledge.""
But there has been another force, that of the military, behind
the Brazilian informatics movement. The military seized power in
1964, and it was not until March 1985 that Brazil elected its first
civilian president in over 20 years.6 0 In the mid-1970s, the Brazil-
ian government began serious efforts to develop its computer tech-
nology, and, at that time, Brazil was concerned that the U.S. would
cut off its sales of computer technology and paralyze Brazil both
militarily and economically." The SEI, which was created in 1979,
was headed by Army and Navy engineers and was originally cre-
ated to administer the military's informatics policies.6 2 It is diffi-
cult, however, to assess the extent of the role that military policy
played in the formulation of Brazil's informatics policy. As one
commentator has noted, "although initially national security justi-
fied Brazil's informatics protectionism . . ., economic concerns ul-
timately spurred the passage of the informatics law."0 3 Whatever
their primary motivation, governments such as Brazil began to fear
that the countries they depended upon for foreign computer tech-
nology would not always fulfill their demands.
57. Id. at 338.
58. Id. at 338-40.
59. See Ed. at 335.
60. See Recent Development, supra note 16, at 622. Tancredo de Almeida Neves was
elected president on January 15, 1985. On March 14, 1985, one day before he was to take
office, Neves underwent emergency surgery. Elected Vice President Jose Sarney automati-
cally became the next civilian president when Neves died on April 21, 1985, never having
been sworn in.
61. Id. at 622.




Developing countries, such as Brazil, lack effective information
technology systems of their own for several reasons:
1) They lack a technological infrastructure that would provide
an environment for research, development, and local innovation;
2) They lack an information infrastructure-the complex net-
work of institutions, organizations, resources and the systems
and services which would support the flow of information from
the generator to the user;
3) They lack available capital for investment in high technology
products and services; and
4) They spend very little on research and development. "
Computer technology, along with the software and the hard-
ware which support that field, continues to advance. To stay
abreast of the rest of the world in information technology, Brazil
must be able to keep up with the ongoing technological develop-
ments in both the hardware and the software areas. Even though
hardware costs continue to decline as a result of the continued
miniaturization of electronic components, the cost of software
seems always to be rising. Just as state-of-the-art computer hard-
ware is essential to information and to communication technolo-
gies, competitive and up-to-date computer software is just as es-
sential. Unfortunately, Brazil and many other developing countries
do not yet have the complete capability of developing or producing
their own computer software. 5 Some experts have postulated that
present Brazilian computer "technology has already become out-
dated by at least five years.""" Once a substantial gap is created in
such a rapidly-advancing field, it becomes very unlikely that Brazil
will be able to seriously compete in that market. In any event, this
is definitely an area in which Brazil should consider liberalizing its
market reserve policy.
C. Brazil's Approach to Software
Brazil's informatics policies not only affect equipment such as
computers, hardware, components and peripheral devices; they
also affect all types of information technologies that are considered
to be commercial products with a corresponding economic value. 7
64. See Bortnick, suapra note 55, at 335-36.
65. See id.
66. Sec Recent Development, supra note 16, at 632.
67. See Bortnick, supra note 55, at 342.
1987-88]
6 INTPER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
Due to the valuable and costly technological information repre-
sented in a supplier's software, the United States, unlike Brazil,
will recognize and protect developers of software by granting ex-
tensive intellectual property rights for software creations. In all
cases, however, a software developer must maintain the secrecy el-
ement in order to ensure that he does not lose the protection af-
forded to the creative ideas behind the software. Disclosure of the
source code or the documentation or any revelation of the lmderly-
ing ideas will destroy the protection granted to software develop-
ers. Consequently, those ideas will then become public information
and will no longer be entitled to protection. The U.S. software sup-
pliers in Brazil are concerned with protection of proprietary rights
in software programs.
Computer software is considered a service under Brazil's in-
formatics legislation and may be imported only under a technology
transfer contract approved by the INPI. Neither patent nor copy-
right protection is presently available for software in Brazil, al-
though a Draft Bill, proposing copyright protection for software, is
currently being considered by CONIN."6 Brazil does not follow the
general internationally accepted policy of regarding software as a
literary work, appropriate for copyright protection.0 If the Bill
goes forward, however, it could be an indication that Brazil's posi-
tion is changing. The proposed Bill will be extensively discussed in
the sections to follow.
For over a decade the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) has sought to work out a code of
conduct for the international transfer of technology, seeking in the
process to elaborate rights and obligations for both the software
supplier and the software acquirer. 1 "The UNCTAD code defines
transfer of technology as the transfer of systematic knowledge for
the manufacture of a product, for the application of a process or
for the rendering of a service .. .72 and explicitly states that...
know-how and technological expertise in the form of. . . instruc-
68. See Recent Development, supra note 16, at 637 n. 130.
69. Gazeta Xlercantil, Aug. 28, 1986, at 1, col 2. See infra note 80.
70. See id. (citing Bawer, New Law Affects Brazil's Big "Informatics" Market, BUs.
AM., Dec. 10, 1984, at 45).
71. See U.S. Software Protection, supra note 32, at 687-88 (construing UNCTAD Code
Ch. 2.1(x), U.N. Doec. TD/CODE TOT/41, at 5 (1983)).




tions7 3 are also considered technology .... This definition of
know-how includes trade secrets and software since they are essen-
tially confidential instructions.""' While the UNCTAD code would
apply to all transactions crossing national borders (including trans-
fers between parent and subsidiary), it is not certain whether the
code applies to transactions within a developing country, such as
transactions between companies under foreign control." It is also
unclear how a foreign country's own national regulations, such as
Brazil's informatics law, would affect a software license agreement
under the UNCTAD Code."
In addition to registration and approval requirements for for-
eign technology imposed by Brazil's Normative Act No. 22, Nor-
mative Act No. 15 establishes five categories of technology trans-
fer: (1) patent licenses; (2) trademark licenses; (3) agreements for
transferring industrial technology or know-how; (4) technical in-
dustrial cooperation agreements; and (5) specialized technical ser-
vices agreements.7 7 Further, Normative Act No. 17 considers all
materials originating with the following sources to be within the
public domain:
a) applications which have been closed or denied;
b) patents which have expired;
c) patents granted in other countries and not applied for or
granted in Brazil;
d) all technology not protected by patent; and
e) all technology comprised within the state-of-the-art."8
At least two problems with this public domain doctrine be-
come immediately obvious; these concern provisions (a) and (d)
above. First, Normative Act No. 22 requires that the SEI and INPI
must approve all technology transfer agreements. Brazil has devel-
oped an extremely broad interpretation of the term "similar"
73. Id.
74- See U.S. Software Protection, supra note 32, at 688 (citing Blair, Overview of Li-
censing and Technology Transfer, 8 N.O. J. INT'L L. & CoiL REQ. 167, 173 (1983)).
75. See U.S. Software Protection, s pra note 82, at 689 (construing UNCTAD Code
Ch. 1.4, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/di, app. C (1983)).
76. See id.
77. Normative Act No- 15 of Sept. 11, 1975, art. IT, translated in Daniel, Licensing in
Brazil, 74 PAT. & TRADEMARK Rxv. 147, 149 (1976) [hereinafter Normative Act No. 15]. See
also Comment, Propietary Protection of Computer Software in the United States and Bra-
zrl, 19 Thx. Ir'NL L.J. 643, 661 (1984)(authored by J. Arnold Aguilar).
78. Normative Act No. 17 of May U, 1976, sec. 15.5, translated in Daniel, The Legal
Ins and Out& of Technology Transfer, 57 BR.AzLIAN Bus. 17 (Nov. 1977). See also Comment,
supra note 77, at 662.
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which the SEI consistently uses as a device to reject requests for
the importation of foreign computers and components on the
ground that similar technology is already available in Brazil."'
Thus, for example, if an application for software importation is
considered closed or is denied by the SEI as being similar to pre-
existing Brazilian software, then that software technology is con-
sidered to be "within the public domain" and should become
"freely available" to all Brazilians under Brazilian technology
transfer policy.
Much of the lively debate in Brazil and abroad concerns itself
with the techno-legal adaptation of the traditional legal systems of
Industrial Property (Patent) Law and Copyright which will be nec-
essary in order to protect a technological work classified by pro-
posed draft legislation as "a veritable abstract industrial crea-
tion."80 Consequently, patent law may be an undesirable form of
protection for computer software in Brazil for at least two reasons.
First, under Brazilian policy, the INPI requires that any patent
license agreement must provide "all the formulas, specifications,
drawings and other information, and all the data needed to achieve
the object of the patent."'8 1 Second, Brazil regards software imports
as nonpatentable technology transfers. Patents are not applied to
software because it is technically impossible to divulge software
technology and, simultaneously, to protect its proprietary rights.Y2
79. "National instruments of analogous technology shall he considered similar to im-
ported digital technology when intended for the same use." Rosenn, supra note 53, at 344
(construing SEI, Normative Act No. 14 of Mar. 18, 1981, art. 1).
80. See UNCLASSIFIED 'U.S. COMM. DEP'T Doe., Translation of Draft Bill-Rules on
Software Rights and Other Provisions [hereinafter cited as Draft Bill] (on file at the offices
of the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review).
8L Normative Act No. 15, supra note 77, sec. 1-2.5.1(c). See also Comment, supra note
77, at 663.
82. See supra note 8, at 105. Normative Act No. 15 indicates that it may be possible to
protect software ideas and technological know-how through an agreement for furnishing in-
dustrial technology. Normative Act No. 15, supra note 77, sec. 1-4.1. U.S. suppliers of tech-
nology believe that know-how and trade secrets should be recognized as proprietary technol-
ogy and that the appropriate method of making this technology available to others is
through licensing agreements. In general, though, developing countries such as Brazil prefer
transfers of technological know-how or trade secrets rather than the licensing of patented
technology. See Comment, supra note 77, at 664. Furthermore, "Brazil does not classify
know-how as industrial property because it feels such classification, and the incumbent li-
censing rights, would benefit only developed nations. As a result, the term 'industrial prop-
erty' is not expressly defined in Brazil's Industrial Property Code, Normative Acts, or in the
law creating the INPI itself." See Comment, rupra note 77, at 664. In addition, technical-
industrial cooperation agreements, when allowed, are closely guarded as to what will be per-
mitted and "may not refer, even implicitly, to any industrial property rights." Rosenn,
supra note 53, at 326.
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Thus, in Brazil the level of protection available to suppliers of
technology is limited either to technological information registered
under the strict provisions of the Industrial Property Code of the
INPI, or an unregistered know-how, which is protected only to the
extent that it is held in secrecy.
Because know-how is protected only as long as it is kept se-
cret, secrecy is clearly the most important element for U.S. inves-
tors to consider in any transfer agreement. Disclosure of the type
of information required to meet Brazilian specifications for patent
license protection would seriously jeopardize that secrecy. Further-
more, under Brazilian law neither actions for injunction nor spe-
cific performance are available to ensure that any violations will
immediately cease."3 For these reasons and others, many U.S. in-
vestors are reluctant to invest in Brazil. Investors need assurance
that profits derived from utilization of their know-how will be re-
mitted and that the know-how itself will be protected from misap-
propriation." Unfortunately, in Brazil, because the technology is
not patented, it must be sold to the recipient of the technol-
ogy-an unacceptable transfer of the U.S. supplier's proprietary
rights.8 5
Despite the inability to license technological know-how, a lim-
ited degree of protection for U.S. software suppliers is still possi-
ble, because the INPI does permit the insertion of a use-restriction
clause in a contract for the sale of technology. The only protection
afforded by a use-restriction clause, however, is an action in con-
tract for violation of a clause prohibiting the Brazilian party's dis-
closure or unauthorized use of the know-how during the term of
the contract." Other alternatives include an action for unfair com-
petition if the information was obtained or used improperly, or a
criminal action for theft or industrial espionage.87
83. See Comment, supra note 77, at 667. See also A- WISE, TRAnE SEorS AND KNOW-
How THROUCHOUr riE WORLD I-201 (1976).
84. See Comment, supra note 77, at 665.
85. Id. Brazil's attitude toward protection for technological know-how is further com-
plicated by the fact that trade secret, or know-how, protection may be the only form which
adequately protects the contents or ideas embodied in a piece of software. Id. at 653.
86. See WisE, supra note 83. See also Comment, supra note 77, at 665.
87. See Comment, supra note 77, at 667 (citing Nattier, supra note 38, at 187). Brazil's
criminal statutes protect against a breach of duty owed to an omployer and guard against
the divulgence of industrial and commercial trade secrets by employees, former employees,
and possible others. The law requires that criminal intent, net mere negligence, must be
shown. The penalty is imprisonment for three months to one year or payment of a "forty-
day" fine. See WIsE, supra note 83, at 1-31, 1-32.
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A third problem arising in relation to software protection con-
cerns Normative Act No. 22. This Act stipulates that registration
of computer software, which is a precondition to the recording at
the INPI of acts or agreements involving computer software, is
only valid for two years with a possibility of renewal." Further-
more, none of the Act's provisions discusses the validity of a
software transfer agreement beyond the expiration of this two year
registration period. As one commentator points out, this short time
limitation increases the risk that software will lose all protection,
not only U.S. protection, before it becomes obsolete.8 9
For purposes of registration, Normative Act No. 22 separates
computer programs into three categories:
1) Programs developed in Brazil by natural persons resident or
domiciled in Brazil, or persons incorporated in Brazil under the
permanent and sole control of persons resident and domiciled in
Brazil;
2) Programs developed abroad that are of interest to Brazil and
that have technology and rights of economic exploitation, as well
as subsequent updating and maintenance services, have been
transferred to specialized national companies capable of carry-
ing out those services with their own Brazilian personnel and of
developing new programs or services; and
8) All other programs.'
Registration and importation of information services or computer
programs in the third category is not permitted where the SEI de-
termines that the service can be provided domestically. Nor will
registration be allowed upon a determination that either a national
[Brazilian] alternative is available or that a program registered
under the second category is available. Finally, no registration is
permitted if the possibility of development of similar programs ex-
ists in Brazil.91
Many U.S. software exporters are reluctant to do business in
Brazil due to the Normative Acts and registration requirements.2
Under the Paris Copyright Convention, "published works of na-
tionals of any Contracting State and works first published in that
88. Normative Act No. 22, supra note 38, art. 6.
89. See U.S. Software Protection, supra note 32, at 691.
90. Normative Act No- 22, supra note 38, art. 3. See also Comment, supra note 77, at
670.
91. Normative Act No. 22, supra note 38, art. 4.
92. See U.S. Software Protection, supra note 32, at 691.
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state shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the same protec-
tion as that other State accords to works of its nationals first pub-
lished in its own territory, as well as the protection specially
granted by this Convention."' ' - Although Brazil and the United
States have both signed the Paris Convention, computer programs
created in the United States or by nationals do not automatically
receive the same treatment as those created by Brazilian nationals.
One reason for this unequal treatment is the broad definition of
public domain in Normative Act No. 17. For example:
1) It is no infringement of Brazilian copyright law to reproduce
passages or excerpts from published works and include them, or
short compositions in their entirety, in another work if the latter
work is of a scientific character and the source and author of the
excerpted portions are indicated.
2) Reproducing extracts from published works does not infringe
Brazilian copyright law as long as the reproduction is for an
educational or scientific purpose."
Proposed draft legislati6n dealing specifically with copyright
protection of computer software produced much infighting among
government officials over what Brazil could bargain for regarding
the reservation of its informatics market during Brazil's meeting
with U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter December 12-13,
1986 in Brussels. 5 As a result, a provision that would have allowed
the establishment of consortiums by foreign and Brazilian national
firms for "the development, production, and merchandizing of
software" was withdrawn at the last minute before the Brazilian
Congress recessed 8 Examination of this proposed copyright legis-
lation is the subject of subsequent sections.
111. REMEDIES
Foreign firms are not waiting passively for Brazil to change its
93. Universal Copyright Convention as Revised at Paris, 1971, art. I. sec. 1, 25 U.S.T.
1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter cited as Universal Copyright
Convention].
94. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANnZATIN (WIPO). Pus No. 603(E), Brazil,
COPYRIGHT LAW Sunvay 1,2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as WIPO, COPYRIGHT LAW SurvEY]
(construing law No. 5,988 of Dec. 14, 1973, arts. 49-51). See also Comment, supra note 77, at
671.
95. See Draft Bill, sapra note 80; Brazil Proposes to Provide 25-Year Term of Copy-
right Protection for Software, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRmHT J. (BNA), Dec. 11, 1M86, at 118
thereinafter Brazil Proposes].
96. Brazil Proposes, supra note 95, at 118-19.
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informatics market reserve policy. Some firms are entering into
joint venture with Brazilian-owned firms in order to stay "in the
running" for the substantial profits which stand to be made in the
growing domestic market. Others, however, have fallen victim to
forced salesY7 But once a foreign firm has "taken the plunge" and
decided to stay and grow with the market, it faces the very difficult
problem of deciding how to structure a joint venture with the se-
lected Brazilian partner and protect its technology, notably its
software, at the same time.9 8
The first major joint venture is currently being arranged be-
tween IBM and Gerdau, a Brazilian steel company with little expe-
rience in informatics. 9 The two companies will work together in
data-processing services only; equity will be 70% held by the Bra-
zilian partner, with IBM providing technology and 30% of the eq-
uity.'0 0 The association between IBM and Gerdau is a typical one
following the rules approved by the SEI, but joint venture ap-
proval by the SEI is not always guaranteed.' 0 ' Some Brazilian ob-
servers report that permission for joint venture has been denied, in
some cases, because of the parent firm's expectation of "continued
technological dependence." In essence, this was seen by Brazil as
merely allowing takeover of local Brazilian firms by multinational
corporations (MNCs). 0 2 The projection by MNC executives is
that, while the SEI probably will not approve joint ventures "en
masse," associations probably will be authorized one-by-one over
the next two or three years, because joint ventures have already
"been accepted in principle."'0 3 Now, what can be done about pro-
tection for foreign technology in cases where a joint venture is
approved?
A. Background of Brazil's Proposed Copyright Bill
In 1986, it was revealed that Brazil was attempting to formu-
late legislation which would give protection similar to that of a
97. Bus. Lat. Am., Oct. 27, 1986, at 330. Initially, joint ventures were prohibited by the
Informatics legislation. See supra note 23. See also Recent Development, supra note 16, at
687. This is one area where Brazil has recently relaxed its strict Informaticr policies.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100 Id. at 331.





copyright to creators of computer software for a period of six to
eight years. 104 The decision by CONIN to apply copyright law to
software may reveal a firm governmental position in that it was
supported unanimously by the government ministers, who are
members of the Council (CONIN).0 5 A representative of the Bra-
zilian Informatics Movement (MBI) revealed, at a meeting held in
Brazil in August 1986, that an outline of possible approaches to
software protection was discussed. The three forms of protection
considered were: copyright, patent, and a sui generis approach.' 6
In 1984, a law professor who served on the committee which
developed the proposed informatics legislation revealed that Bra-
zil's intention at that time was to treat computer software more as
an industrial product in the framework of patent law, rather than
as a work of literature or art covered by copyright 0 7 After a vote,
the government ministers were unanimously supportive of a copy-
right approach.'
Presently, Brazilian copyright law provides protection for in-
tellectual creations, regardless of their form of expression, during
the life of the author plus sixty years,' but it does not cover com-
puter software. In general, the rights of a Brazilian author extend
to any form of use, such as publication, translation or adapta-
tion."0 Two copies of the work must be deposited at the National
Library, the National Music Institute, or the National School of
Fine Arts of the Federal District, according to the nature of the
work sought to be protected. Computer programs pose a difficult
preliminary problem in this respect, because a program does not fit
easily into any of these categories. 1 '
The new CONIN copyright proposal envisions extending copy-
right protection to computer software, recommending a period not
to exceed twenty-five years.1 If passed, the new legislation will
not maintain the lifetime protection presently provided other form
104. See supra note 69, at 1, col. 6.
105. Id. at 18, col. 1.
108. Id.
107. See supra note 18, at 321 (statement by Kleber Avila-Pereira).
108. See supra note 69, at 13, col. L
109. CIVIL CODE OF THE UmND STATES OF BRAZIL, bk. II, tit. II, Ch. VI, art. 649, sec. 1
(1958) [hereinafter CIVIL CoDE OF BRAZIL].
110. WIPO COPYRIGHT LAW SuRvy, supra note 94, arts. 29-47.
ilL See Comment supra note 77, at 669 (construing CIVIL CODE OF BRAZIL, supra note
109, art. 673).
112. See supra note 69.
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copyright."3 One reason for this limitation period is that the useful
life of computer software is very short. 4 This short software life is
enhanced by the continuing advances made in computer hardware.
For example, smaller computer "chips" can handle larger quanti-
ties of data and information in shorter intervals of time. Subse-
quently, new state-of-the-art computer software is necessary to
support the ongoing hardware improvements. Accordingly, the pe-
riod of legal protection afforded by the new tax law will probably
be fixed at six to eight years, not the full twenty-five years recom-
mended by CONIN.'15 The new copyright law will be based upon
both the decisions of CONIN and a Congressional Draft Bill
presented by Senator Vergilio Tavora.'
The bill proposed by Senator Tavora is the one currently
before the Brazilian Congress on the subject of software. It sug-
gests a specific "mixed" approach to software protection, based on
copyright and industrial property law and would give protection to
computer software for fifteen years from the date of its registra-
tion. 1 7 If passed, this legislation would be a major improvement
for protecting software suppliers. Presently, Normative Act No. 22
stipulates that registration of computer software is valid for only
two years and provides only a possibility of renewal."8 I
'Senator Tavora insists that legal protection of computer
software, solely under copyright law, is inappropriate because a
computer program is a technical means achieving a result and
should not be confused with artistic, literary, and scientific works
which identify the expressions of their creator's personality and
have value and significance in themselves.1 1 9 As to the application
of industrial property law, Senator Tavora states that computer
software cannot always be considered solely as an "invention."' 2"
Thus, neither this form alone nor pure copyright protection is ade-
quate for protecting computer software.
According to the proposed bill, software legislation should
113. Id. at 13, col. 3.
114. Id. Software technology is perpetually progressing and better more efficient
software is constantly being developed.
115. Id.
116. Id. at cc]. 4. See also Draft Bill, supra note 80.
117. See supra note 69, at 13, col. 3.
118. See Normative Act No. 22, sapra note 38, arL. 6.
119. See supra note 69, at 13, col. 4-5. See also Draft Bill, supra note 80 (Justification
section).
120. Id. See also Draft Bill, supra note 80 (Justification).
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contemplate certain principles which include:
1) remuneration of material and intellectual investment;
2) equal protection of software, domestic and foreign, a distinc-
tion only imperative for the marketing of software in Brazil;
3) a performance guarantee to the user;
4) a time limitation on software rights for producers; and
5) compatibility of rules for software protection with those ap-
plicable to commercialization of technology in general, particu-
larly exchange and tax interests. 2 '
An examination of the main points of the proposed bill, with these
principles in mind, may serve to illuminate areas which could still
present problems for multinational software producers in Brazil.
B. Overview of Brazil's Copyright Draft Bill
The Brazilian copyright bill, if passed, will become the legal
instrument for establishing rights relative to computer software be-
cause the system legalized specifically rules out any other form of
software protection.1 2 A restatement of some of the main features
of the bill includes the following provisions:
1. The rights conferred apply equally to foreigners domiciled
abroad, provided they can prove their country grants rights to
Brazilians of equivalent scope and duration [Ch. I, art. 2].
2. The software producer maintains exclusive rights in the use or
authorization of use of the program, including the right to make
versions or derived programs [Ch. II, art. 4]. The rights in a de-
rived program which may come to be produced by an authorized
third party, shall belong to the third party.2 3
3. To enhance the possibility of registration, all documents au-
thenticated by the SEI shall be given over to SEI [Ch. III, art.
121. These include: (a) the source code; (b) internal specifica-
tions; (c) description of the program; (d) a user's manual; (e)
specifications describing the relations between the characters in
the program; and (f) a declaration by the petitioner/producer
describing the nature of the software. These are necessary to
permit making full use of the program once it becomes public
121. See supra note 69, at col. 5.6. See also Draft Bill, supra note 80 (Justification).
122. Draft Bill, supra note 80, art. 1.
123. The actual phrase in the translation of the Draft Bill reads . . . the rights in a
derived program which may come to be produced by an authorized third party shall be his
and he shall make use of them autonomously" (emphasis added) [Ch. II, art. 51. Article 4,
however, awards the software producer exclusive rights to authorize third parties "to ex-
hibit, store or market software and its versions." [Ch. II, art. 4]. Draft Bill, supra, note 80.
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property [Ch. III, art. 14].
4. Once registered, computer program rights are assured to the
producer for fifteen years from the date of entry of the request
for registration. Entertainment software, however, is protected
for two years. All computer programs and their versions shall
become public property, and technical documentation on file
shall be made available to interested parties when: (a) the copy-
right term expires, or (b) registration has been denied or can-
celled [Ch. IV, art 23].
5. Supplementary technical service to the software shall be guar-
anteed to the user during the period of valid registration [Ch. V,
art. 27].
6. The producer of the software may make use of cryptographics
or any other resources aimed at impeding or hindering reproduc-
tion or non-authorized use of the software [Ch. V, art. 281.24
7. (a) The software producer may not deny authorization to in-
terested third parties for generating a derived program if
CONIN declares it to be of relevant economic and social interest
in the application for which it is intended [Oh. VI, art. 31], or
for the production of a derived program if it is intended for use
in automatic information processing machines manufactured or
used in Brazil [Ch. VI, art. 32]. (b) If the software producer does
not agree to the authorization, the matter shall be submitted to
CONIN to mediate between the parties and stipulate the
amount deemed to be adequate remuneration. A commission of
three members of CONIN shall establish the just value of the
authorization. If the software producer does not agree to the
value determined, he may appeal that valuation as long as his
appeal to the judiciary does not impede the immediate use of
the software [Ch. VI, art 33].15
8. The -Federal Government of Brazil may proceed to effect the
expropriation of the software when it is in the public interest to
do so [Ch. VI, art. 34].
9. (a) A description of penalties for violation of any rights relat-
ing to software that may be conferred by the Draft Bill [Ch.
124. In the case of Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., this method of
protection was actually used to protect Apple's computer programs from misappropriation
by competitors. The systems programmer, Jim Haston, actually embedded his name in one
of Apple's programs (Master Create), and had embedded the word "Applesoft" in another
program. These served unquestionably to identify these programs which had been misap-
propriated by Franklin. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1245 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) [hereinafter Apple-Franklin].
125. In addition, article 18 provides that individuals domiciled abroad shall nominate
an attorney in Brazil to deal with all matters related to rights and obligations, and who shall
act fur him as of the date of the request for software registration [h. 111, art. 181. Draft
Bill, supra note 80.
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VIII, art. 36]. (b) Regardless of criminal action, the party
harmed may "enter an action to prohibit the infractor from
practicing the incriminating act." This action can be accumu-
lated with an action for losses and damages resulting from the
infraction [Ch. IX, art. 40].128 (c) An action for voiding the regis-
tration is a defense action and can be entered at any time.27
10. Those having title to rights in operating system or support
system software are compelled to disclose information on their
functional and data interfaces "to a degree sufficient to permit
use of such programs in relation with others produced by third
parties" [Ch. XI, art. 52]. 12 1
Senator Tavora's copyright bill has already been approved by the
Committee on Law and the Constitution and, in August 1986, was
under examination by the Committee on National Security.1 29
Miguel Teixeira, ex-subsecretary of the SEl_, agrees with Sena-
tor Tavora that pure copyright protection is inappropriate for com-
puter software. In his view, the fundamental differences between
art and the utilitarian nature of software should be recognized-"9
Furthermore, Teixeira believes that the constraints of copyright
protection may operate to make the software user overly depen-
dent upon the software manufacturer and prevent improvements
in software programs.1 3' Legislation using a modified copyright ap-
proach is considered to be a convenient way "to please the United
States" as well as to provide an incentive for the software industry
to eliminate the "pirates" from the market.' 2 Teixeira stresses
that, depending upon the extent of the modifications, adoption of a
modified copyright approach in the software area in fact amounts
to the adoption of a sui generis approach to software protection. 3
In addition, Teixeira predicts that it is most probable that a pro-
126. The following fall under a two-year statute of limitations: rights of the producer
[art. 4]; rights of the user in derived programs [art. 5]; duty to update software [art. 25];
duty to provide supplementary service to software [art. 271; and duty to provide technical
quality software [art. 29]. Id.
127. Any interested party or the Federation may enter an action to nullify registration
during its term of validity [Ch. X, art. 44]_ Also recall that "computer programs and their
versions become public property and the technical documentation on file shall be made
available for inspection by interested parties when: b) the registration was denied or . . .
cancelled." [Ch. IV, art. 23]. Id.
128. Draft Bill, supra note 50.
129. See supra note 69, at 13, col. 4.
130. Id. at col. 1.
131. Id. at col. 2.
132. Id.
133. Id. at col. 1.
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tection period of twenty-five years will be adopted "for political
reasons," since all countries adopting copyright for computer
software are adopting that amount of time as a standard."'
In the opinion of Ercole Carpentieri, Vice President of the
Brazil-United States Chamber of Commerce in Sao Paulo,
GONIN's approval of copyright for protection of computer
software shows that Brazil "has opted for a practical path, leaving
aside emotionalism and seeking an understanding in a discrete
manner."'13 15 Carpentieri points out that the Brazilian ambassador
had already promised the adoption of the copyright criteria to the
U.S. government during discussions of informatics in Paris in early
July 1986.'s
Although CONIN's decision was well-received in the United
States, it was not so well-received in the Brazilian Congress. The
few Brazilian Congressmen who expressed their opinion "repudi-
ated the adoption of copyright law, considered by all as a Brazilian
capitulation in the face of U.S. pressure."'1 One congresswoman
commented publicly that Congress had already decided that com-
puter hardware would be developed using Brazilian domestic tech-
nology; to be consistent with that policy, Brazil must give incen-
tives and protection to its own software as well as to that of foreign
firms.'t  She admitted that she found it inconceivable that, by a
single action, the spirit of the Informatics law might be altered. "
On September 19, 1986, in the wake of such criticisms, Busi-
ness Latin America reported that "CONIN had essentially undone
its earlier ruling granting substantial copyright protection to
software developed by international firms, by attaching so many
conditions that the protection previously granted had been ren-
dered meaningless.' 140 Although the original ruling technically still
holds, it is believed that CONIN qualified certain areas of its first
ruling because of tremendous pressures exerted by local computer
companies in Brazil, by SEI, and by INPI.' 4 1 Two ereas of concern
134. Id.
135. Id. at col. 3-4.
136. 1d.
137. Id- at col. 1.
138. Statement by Congresswoman Cristina Tavares quoted in the Brazilian newspaper,
Gazeta MereantiL Id.
139. Id.
140. Bus. LaL Am., Sept. 29, 1986, at 304.
141. Id. Indeed, on December 9, 1986, President Jose Sarney received the final execu-




1) Foreign-owned firms will be allowed to market only software
developed by their own parent companies and intended for com-
puters which are not made in Brazil and for which no local pro-
duction plans exist. (Under this provision, essentially only lo-
cally-owned firms may sell software for personal computers);
and
2) AR software (not just that sold to public entities) will now be
required to be registered with SEI. 42
For the time being, the only hope is the chance that the next Con-
gress will overturn the current rulings.1 43
IV. ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL'S OPTIONS
A. Socio-Cultural and Economic Aspects of Informatics
In redefining the relations between the big industrialized
countries an the Third World, there are two views of the develop-
ments. The first may be stated as follows: "[Sjhimmering and
gleaming in front of the 'miserable masses of the Third World,' the
personal computer will supposedly, 'enable them to pass directly
from the neolithic age to the post-industrial society.' "" The other
view, with which the first may be compared, would hold:
For all these prophets who pay no attention to history or to so-
cial conditions and propose a "Marshall Plan for computers,"
without the slightest concern for the symbolic aspect of this
"Marshall Plan" which, if it enabled the post-war reconstruction
of Europe, also delivered it, trussed and bound, to the United
States, not that of Hemingway or Dalton Trumbo, but that of
McCarthy and Rockefeller, we are henceforth on the threshold
expected 25-year term of copyright protection for both foreign and Brazilian-made software
and established fines and jail sentences of up to two years for copyright violations. However,
a provision that would have allowed the establishment of consortiums between foreign and
Brazilian firms, was eliminated. Renato Archer, Brazilian Minister of Science and Technol-
ogy commented that he personally decided to omit the concession provision from the draft
bill because it "could give the impression that we were establishing [more flexible] regula-
tions for Article 12 of the informatics law." See supra note 95. Article 12 sets out guidelines
for the establishment of Brazilian firms producing goods protected by the market reserve
provisions for the industry. See Informaties Law, supra note 19, art. 12.
142. See supra note 140.
i42. Id.
144. FREEDOM oF OnoICE, srpra note 11, at 12 (citing Le Nouuel Obseruateur 64 (1982),
conversation with J.J. Servan-Schreiber June 5, 1965).
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of the "superstruggle of tomorrow.""l4"
The above quotations, at first, seem diametrically opposed to
one another. The first, a remark by a French diplomat and noted
author, seems to be unbridled optimism. He sees the transfer of
knowledge as the panacea and the outline of a promising future for
the whole of humanity. The second, a comment on the views of
another noted author, seems more sobering. Which is closer to re-
ality? Or are they both reality? It is probably not an over-general-
ization to report that, today, very few studies on the subject of
information technology "take into account the role played by com-
munications systems in the sociocultural development of a na-
tion."' 4 6 In order to understand the role played by communication
and information technology within a developing nation such as
Brazil, it is necessary to know something of that nation's history.
147
Even though all communication systems, such as radio, televi-
sion, free press and data processing, are not of equal importance in
each country, it is predicted that the integrative nature of com-
puter technology as a new pacesetter will reorganize all the seg-
ments of the communication industry into a new hierarchy. 4" One
commentator has stated that "[ciountries are no longer defined in
terms of the place they occupy on maps, but in terms of the inter-
relations maintained by the different elements of the transnational
complex."'4 9 One aspect of that interrelationship is the extent to
which a nation such as Brazil is seen as being dependent upon for-
eign technology. In a presentation to the Fourth Conference of
Latin American Computer Authorities (CALAI) the Brazilian rep-
resentative summarized this interrelationship:
Brazil, like many Latin American countries, entered the
computer industry as a consumer of imported goods and ser-
vices, whereas the central countries, particularly the United
States, had already sufficiently developed their own markets and
were seeking to conquer new markets owing to the opening up of
new commercial frontiers in this sector. We learned how to han-
dle the computer through courses, offered principally by hard-
ware manufacturers who were both distributors and suppliers of
145. Fn s DoM OF CHoIcE, supra note 11, at 13 (commenting on statements and ideas of
Alvin Toffler presented in A. TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVF, 436 (1980))-
146. FREEDOM OF CHOICE, supra note 11, at 41.
147. Id. at 44.
148. Id. at 45.
149- Id. at 46.
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material, owners of technology, and responsible for the training
of specialized labor ...
The function of the knowledge disseminated was to broaden
the market and was limited to the technology of using computer
resources which became veritable black boxes.150
This view is echoed by one Brazilian scientist, who describes the
relationship between Brazil's scientists and the Medical Literature
and Retrieval System (MEDLARS) data bank network as a
"pseudo-transfer of technology."' 5 1 In view of the fact that the five
million pieces of data in the MEDLARS system reside in the U.S.
National Library of Medicine,1 52 this scientist describes a total de-
pendence upon the innovations produced overseas which reduces
the transfer of this technology to "the acquisition of a black
box."'5 3 In her view, constant research and development must be
conducted within Brazil before it will be able to negotiate with and
contribute to the outside world.15 4
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of research and develop-
ment efforts, various proposals have been made for measuring the
development of the computer industry in Latin American coun-
tries. Researchers from IBM and Mitsubishi have established a
classification system which names seven different stages through
which each developing country must pass. Each of those seven
stages is defined by eight key variables.'5 5 But as one Chilean spe-
cialist pointed out, these types of classifications "often rest on out-
dated data."'15 Commenting on computer development in his own
country, this specialist felt that it was obvious that Chile had gone
beyond the particular phase in which they were classed and, in ad-
dition, that there was another intermediary stage that had not
been included in the model. 7
Massachussetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has developed
150. Id. at 71.
151. Id. at 131.
152. Id. at 121-22.
153. Id at 121.
154. Id. at 132.
155. Id. at 69. The eight variables are: number and size of computers, state of teaching
of data processing, applications of the computer, government use of computers, share of
technology held by nationals, official policy towards computers, international assistance in
computer technology, esistence of professional data processing groups, and user associa-
tions. Id.
156. Id. (citing Pine, Nival nacional de desarrollo de law comnputacion, Informatica,
July 1980, at 17).
157. Id. at 69-70.
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its own descriptive model in its attempts to establish a potential
index of the development of the computer industry in Latin
America. MIT's Computer Industry Development Potential
(CIDP) is composed of eleven weighted variables grouped under
three headings. 58 According to the results obtained using this
model, the most advanced stage is equivalent to 65 points on the
CIDP index (out of a total of 100 points). In 1976, Brazil, Latin
America's most advanced country, amassed a total of only 52
points," 9 which may be an accurate indicator of the fact that Bra-
zil invests very little of its GNP in research and development. This
may be illustrated by a remark made by a noted Brazilian re-
searcher comparing Brazilian electronics research laboratories to
those of IBM:
If, by any chance, all the microelectronics researchers in Brazil
took the same airplane to go to a seminar and this airplane
crashed, the country would be left without a single researcher in
this field, for their present number is no more than 200. On the
other hand, no airplane in the world is sufficiently big to accom-
modate all the researchers of just one of IBM's laboratories, the
one in New York for example.'
The analysis is not complete without a look at the flip side of
158. FREEDOM OF CHoIcE, supra note 11, at 70. Economic variables include: a) Gross
National Product (30 pts.); b) Per Capita GNP (15 pts.); c) Growth rates of GNP and per
capita GNP combined (5 pts.); d) Percent of GNP in "high technology areas" (10 pts.).
Educational variables are: a) Literacy rate (10 pts.); b) Relative number of students en-
rolled in secondary school or above (5 pts.); c) Level of technical education (5 pts.). Techno-
logical variables are: a) Electricity generated (8 pts.); b) Number of telephones per 1000 (7
pts.); c) Number of television sets installed (2 pts.); d) Number of computers in the country
(3 pts.). Id-
159. Id. Under the IBM and Mitsubishi model, the initial stage corresponds to initial
introduction or experimentation [Haiti]; the initial to basic stage corresponds to the begin-
ning use and knowledge of the technology [Honduras, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Costa Rica]; the
basic stage is characterized by the proliferation of machines and inst ,lations [Peru, Chile
and Cuba]; the basic to operational stage is marked by consideration of fundamental
problems of the impact of computerized activities on the national balance of payments, gov-
ernment activities, and the life of firms [Venezuela, Puerto Rico]; the operational stage is
described as a consolidation stage [Mexico, Argentina]; the operational to advanced stage
begins with the integration of the various elements of the data processing industry into a
national framework [Brazil]; and the advanced stage, which corresponds to the ultimate
level of maturity, but which has not been reached by any Latin American country. The data
in the CIDP index do not reveal the scores of any Latin American countries other than
Brazil, nor do they report any more up-to-date ratings for Brazil. They do indicate, however,
that IBM and Mitsubishi have devised a correlation model between their stages of data
processing developments and the CIDP index. Id. at 69.
160. Id. at 136.
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Brazil's fears of dependence upon overseas innovations and
pseudo-transfers of technology, namely, the development of Bra-
zil's own computer policy. Unlike the rest of Latin America, the
advent of computers in Brazil has been accompanied by state-sup-
ported industrial development efforts. 1 Brazil's strategy is based
on a doctrine of national security (in line with the general princi-
ples established by the military government of Brazil after the
1964 coup) and a desire for national sovereignty.1 6 2 Brazil sees it as
an absolute necessity to create a domestic computer technology
sector so that it may guarantee its own independence in this field.
Brazil also has a need to assure the supply of such equipment for
its armed forces.163
The problem is a complex one for U.S. multinational corpora-
tions. IBM, for example, has been in Brazil since 1939; its first fac-
tory outside the U.S. was installed in the region of Benfica (Rio de
Janeiro). 1 14 Even though IBM's share of the Third World scarcely
exceeds five percent of its total revenue, no public or private or-
ganization has a greater total number of large computers in Latin
America. Likewise, no organization has shown more interest than
IBM in looking for new ways to use computers in the region and to
find the necessary personnel.' 5 What can be made of IBM's in-
volvement in Latin America?
In the words of one commentator, "solving problems . . . is
what characterizes the basic activity of IBM," but IBM never de-
fines the problems it plans to resolve; it only offers its computer-
ized solution.'16 Its computerized solution must always be sup-
ported by the necessary software, which may also be sold to other
customers with the same problems. Once again, we are back to the
Black Box; a Black Box that just keeps changing hands. Brazil's
161. Id. at 104. Attempts have been made to construct national computer industries in
other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Mexico and Cuba. In general, however,
they have not succeeded in emerging into active policies motivated by consistent backing.
Only Cuba, along with Brazil, has made consistent efforts to establish a basic policy with the
intent of establishing a national industry. Id. at 104, n.5.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 136.
165. Id. at 137. In 1980, IBM devoted 1,277 million dollars to research and development
throughout the world. The second ranking U.S. firm was Digital Equipment Corporation
(DEC) with 217 million dollars, less than one fifth of IBM's total. The ten largest American
computer firms had 73% of the total investments for research in this field; IBM alone was
responsible for almost half of this. Id. at 136,
166. Id. at 140.
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misgivings in this respect may be grasped by the following:
The search for software, which gives a raison d'etre to the ma-
chine ... creates a redeployment of social connections between
the hardware manufacturer and the individuals. . . which con-
tribute their intellectual raw material. The search for solutions
becomes a pious adventure of creativity extraction for the firm,
within the limits imposed by a "final solution," over which it has
control.1 67
It cannot come as a complete surprise that Brazil and similar
developing countries want no part of this. Brazil maintains that
"[pirotection is a needed tool to bridge the dependence gap, and is
to be removed gradually as indigenous capacity is able to face ex-
ogenous competition." ' In 1980, Executive Secretary Brizida of
SEI explained that the aim of the Brazilian informatics policy of
control was not meant to restrain information flow but rather "to
give commercial reciprocity to the exchange of information among
countries."'" Does this mean that Brazil's informatics policy may
be viewed as a "bargaining chip" which may be used to exchange
attenuated informatics restrictions for trade concessions? If so,
there may be some recent indications that some concessions are
beginning to be made.
Until recently, IBM has been unable to enter the restricted
computer market in Brazil because of Brazil's reserve market pol-
icy of limiting foreign involvement in the local manufacture of
computers to mainframes; the mini- and micro-computer markets
are largely reserved for local Brazilian companies.'2 In order to get
around those restrictions, IBM has offered to share its technology
and marketing system with Brazilian companies in joint ventures
and licensing arrangements;' 7 ' recently, IBM has become the first
firm approved by the SEI for a major joint venture with the Brazil-
ian steel group, Gerdau, for data processing services.7 2
167. Id.
168. Bortnick, supra note 55, at 340 (citing Saur, Informatics, New Technologies and
Data Regulction: A View From the Third World, in DATA REGULATION: EUROPEAN & THIRD
WoRaa REALITIES 223, 224 (On Line 1978)).
169. Bortnick, supra note 55, at 340 (address by Joubert de Oliviera Brizida, Executive
Secretary of the Brazilian Special Secretariat of Informatics, 1980 Intergovernmental Bu-
reau for Informatics Conference on Transborder Data Flow Policies in Rome, Italy (June 23,
1980), reprinted in 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA RRP. No. 3/, at 33-34 (1980)).
170. Let. Am. Reg. Rep. Brazil, May 30, 1986, at 6, col. 1.
171. See Seidman, sruprn note 4, at 68.
172. See supra note 97.
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Even though political risk analysts are forecasting a "fairly
stable political climate for Latin American governments" such as
Brazil in 1987, this does not mean the analysts are "giving the
green light to U.S. investors and exporters to put their money into
Central and South America-just the opposite."' 73 In February of
1987, Brazil, the developing world's largest debtor, 17 declared a
moratorium, suspending interest payments on the $70 billion it
owes in interest to commercial banks because "these disburse-
ments drain their resources and keep their economies from grow-
ing."'2 5 Brazil is not alone,1 76 but it is the most recent default. The
result, according to one source, is that "the attitude among many
U.S. companies is that they wish they'd never heard of the term,
Latin America."''
B. Playing By A New Set of Rules
The reserve market share approach is reported to have proven
profitable for Brazilian computer manufacturers, but unfortu-
nately, the cost of Brazil's experiment has been borne by the Bra-
zilian consumer.1 78 The consumer is forced to purchase outdated
Brazilian technology at exorbitant prices 7 9 or buy computer prod-
ucts at a premium from the developing Brazilian "Black Mar-
ket".8 0 In addition to the black market in imported software, com-
173. Resnick, Companies Must Tread With Care, The Miami Herald, Mar. 23, 1987
(Business/Monday), at 23, col. 1.
174. Brazil's foreign debt reached a total of $108.8 billion in February 1987, making
Brazil the undisputed leader on the list of eleven Latin American countries carrying the
largest debts. Mexico follows owing $101.6 billion, and Argentina in third, owing $51.0 bil-
lion, according to recent assessments by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean. Oppenheimer, Debtor Nations Come Up Empty, The
Miami Herald, Mar. 23, 1987 (Business/Monday), at 13, col. 1.
175- Id. at 14, col. 1.
176. Nicaragua, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador have stopped servicing the bulk of
their foreign debts. Several other countries, including Costa Rica, are paying only a portion
of what they owe. Brazil says it cannot pay because of a plunge in its trade surplus. Because
of Brazil's recent sizeable default, most U.S. economists and bankers are not convinced that
financial measures taken in the past to contain Latin America's $382 billion foreign debt
crisis are still working. Id. at 13, coL 1.
177. Comment by Jerry Haar, Associate Professor of International Business at Florida
International University. Professor Haar went on to explain that South America's mounting
debt, shrinking hard currency reserves, and weak commodity prices are making both the
analysts and investors "leery," at least for the time being. Resnick, supra note 173.
178. Recent Development, supra note 16, at 630.
179. Id. at 6,92. See also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
180. Ole BraZilian firm openly admits making cumpuers; compatible with illegal inter-
national software, because it cannot compete with black market wares. Id. at 632-33.
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ponents, and whole computers, there is widespread and blatant
"pirating" of foreign technology, apparently with government ap-
proval. z81 According to one source, the Brazilian government seems
"unsympathetic to the plight of the foreign companies," arguing
the Brazilian companies "cannot be expected to reinvent what al-
ready exists.' 2 What seems to be needed is reassurance for for-
eign manufacturers and software producers that their technological
investment will not ultimately be swept into the stream of illicit
trade in computer hardware or that their software will not be bla-
tantly copied without any royalty payments being made.
Following close on the heels of Brazil's latest economic set-
back, the time seems ripe for change. Though they may not solve
the complex problems facing Brazil in this area, at least five ap-
proaches may warrant consideration by foreign computer
companies:
1. Prepare to wait until the ban on imports is lifted;83
2. File suit in cases where infringement exists;
3. Enter into user agreements with Brazilian branches using for-
eign software;'5 4
4. Attack Brazil's market reserve policy as a violation of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT);155 or
5. Offer trade concessions in the form of higher entry quotas and
lower tariffs at the U.S. border in return for a more compromis-
ing form of the market reserve share policy.'"
1. Prepare to Wait
The general consensus among U.S. companies is that Brazil's
181. Often the equipment is advertised as the "Brazilian Version" of the foreign prod-
uct. Id. at 633.
182. Id. at 633 (citing Brazil's Prickly Computer Policy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1984, at
F12, col. 3.).
183. Recent Development, supra note 16, at 685. See also Bawer, supra note 70.
184. Recent Development, supra note 16, at 639 n.146.
185. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 T.N.T.S. 187. The GAIT Agreement has been modified
in several respects since 1947; the current version is contained in GE.rnnAL AoRrMENT ON
TAirFS AND ThADE, IV BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969). The term
GATT is also used to refer to the organization made up of the contracting parties to the
General Agreement. Here, the term General Agreement is used to refer specifically to the
agreement itself. Note, Legal Problems in Expanding the Scope of GATT to Include Ser-
vices, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J, 281 (1982-83) [hereinafter Expanding the Scope of GATT].
186. Oppenheimer, Playing By A New 8et of Rules. The Miami Herald, Mar. 28, 1987
(Business/Monday), at 27, col. 2
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market reserve policy will not last forever;8 7 one reason may be
that, as previously discussed, some firms are entering into joint
ventures to avoid falling victim to forced sales. 1 Though not all
joint venture proposals are approved,' " the SEI tends to look more
favorably on proposals which (1) link small manufacturers with
strong financial institutions, (2) propose establishing research and
development centers in Brazil, or (3) indicate a positive trade bal-
ance."90 In view of the fact that, initially, no joint ventures between
Brazilian and foreign firms were permitted,1" ' the recent develop-
ments with IBM's joint venture approval may be a signal that Bra-
zil is loosening its grip on the reserve market share.
2. File Suit for Copyright Infringement
A foreign company which decides to do more than wait until
informatics restrictions are lifted could file suit in the Brazilian
courts to stop the pirating of its personal computer technology.1"2
IBM, for example, has routinely resorted to the Brazilian courts to
file copyright infringement suits against firms it claims have file-
gally copied its software.'9 3 In choosing this course, however, the
foreign company in a Brazilian court faces some rather thorny
problems. First, it would appear that Brazilian appropriation of
software from ideas disclosed under the SEI filing requirements
would not be redressable under any existing federal statute since,
in Brazil at least, software is considered a servicea" and, as such, is
outside the scope of even the 1979 amendments to the Trade Act
of 1974."19
Secondly, the foreign software producer's consent to the dis-
closure under the proposed copyright bill may prevent the use of
the software from being classified as a "misappropriation" and
187. Recent Development, supra note 16, at 636.
188. See supra note 97 and accompanying text,
189. Id. at 334.
190. Bawer, supra note 70.
191. See supra note 23.
192. Wash. Post, Aug- 29, 1984, at A21, col. 1. Recent Development, supra note 16, at
639.
193. Recent Development, supra note 16, at 639.
194. Id. at 637. There is an ongoing debate as to whether software is to be classified as
goods or as services. See generally Cavanagh, The Supply of Computer Software-Goods or
Services?, 12 Ausnc. Bus. L. Rsv. 195 (1984).
195. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (b)(1) (1982). See generally Sandstrom, Import Relief, Unfair
Trade Practices and the Generalized System of Preferences, 11 LAw. AM. 359 (1979).
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thus an unfair method of competition in certain circumstances- 96
Under the very broad definition of public domain, as construed by
Normative Act No. 17,1s1 it is not an infringement of a Brazilian
copyright to reproduce passages or excerpts from published works
and include them in their entirety in another work if the latter is
for an educational or scientific purpose.1 98 When considered with
certain provisions of the proposed copyright bill, it appears that
authorization for generating a "derived program" from existing
software would be accepted practice.19 9 In reality, this may be little
more than authorized appropriation, and yet it, apparently, may be
practiced with impunity.
Thirdly, although a thorough discussion of the extensive
choice of law problems which may arise is beyond the scope of this
article, a few points noted by other commentators deserve men-
tion. In the absence of a choice of law provision in a technology
transfer agreement, governing law is usually determined by an
analysis of the following contacts: the place of negotiation of the
contract; the place the contract was executed; the place of per-
formance; the place of the subject matter of the contract; and the
place of the domicile, residence, nationality, incorporation and
business of the parties.2 0 In the event that the choice of law is
contrary to a fundamental policy of the forum having the greater
interest in the contract, then the governing law is usually the law
applicable in the absence of an effective choice by the parties."'1 In
addition, a proposal to choose U.S. law to govern a software license
agreement between a U.S. company and a Brazilian company
would violate fundamental Brazilian policies governing technology
transfer. 02 Even with a choice of law clause valid under U.S. law,
enforcement may be impossible if the foreign licensee has no other
contacts with the United States; if the Brazilian courts refuse to
give effect to a U.S. judgment based on that choice of law clause,
then the foreign licensee actually benefits from a breach of the
196. The Draft Bill provides that "all computer programs and their versions shall be-
cone public property, and technical documentation on file shall be made available to inter-
ested parties when: (a) the term expires or (b) registration was denied or cancelled." Draft
Bill, supra note 80, Ch. IV, art. 23.
197. Daniel, supra note 78.
198. WIPO, COPYRIGHT LAW SURVEY, supra note 94.
199. Draft Bill, supra note 80, Ch. VI, art. 81-84.
200. RESTATEMENT (SECObD) CONFLICT 01 LAWS § 188 (2) (1971).
201. Id. at § 187 (2) (b). U.S. Software Protection, supra note 32, at 702.




3. Enter User Agreements
Instead of filing suit, at least one software manufacturer has
approached the U.S. company's problem from a different angle.
This manufacturer has secured agreements from the Brazilian
branches of "over a dozen companies" to avoid illicitly-obtained
pirate copies of its software programs.20 4 This tactic may prove to
be effective, especially when used in conjunction with a provision
in the proposed copyright bill which specifically allows the
software creator to make use of any "cryptographic or other re-
sources aimed at impeding or hindering reproduction or non-au-
thorized use of software. "
2 0 5
4. Expand the Scope of GATT
Presently, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), a multilateral agreement of approximately ninety mem-
ber nations20 6 directed at limiting trade barriers, does not apply to
transnational trade in services.2 0 7 Since software is considered to
be a service in Brazil, contracting nations are not prohibited from
imposing barriers, such as Brazil's market reserve policy, to trade
in those services.2 8 The fundamental principles upon which GATT
is based-reciprocity, mutual advantage, and nondiscrimina-
tion-should be as applicable to trade in services as they are to
trade in goods.'" Because of the growing economic importance of
the services sector in international trade, the U.S. government is
203. Id.
204. This is the approach of Ashton-Tate, a software manufacturer. According to Ash-
ton-Tate lawyer, Robert Kohn, "[they] get much faster results by entering into agreements
(with users) and lobbying with the government rather than going directly after the pirates."
U.S. Software Firms Try to Protect Big American Share of World Market, Wall St. J., Apr.
18, 1985, at 34, col.3. Recent Development, supra note 16, at 639 n.146-
205. Draft Bill, supra note 80, Ch. v, art. 28. This procedure was actually used in the
Apple-Franklin Case. There, not only was it shown to be "almost impossible for so many
lines of code" to be identically written by an independent programmer, but the Apple sys-
tems programmer, James Huston, had embedded his names within one of his programs
(Master Create), and had embedded the word "Applesoft" in another. Both appeared on the
pirated Franklin master disk. Apple-Franklin, supra note 124, at 1245.
206. Seidman, supra note 4, at 52.
207. Expanding the Scope of GATT, supra note 184.
208. Seidman, sapra note 4, at 52.
209. Expanding the Scope of GATT, supra note 184, at 288.
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presently seeking the expansion of the scope of GATT to include
trade in services.2 1 The most significant obstacle to extending
GATT to services is that the language of the General Agreement
refers throughout to goods and to specific concepts that relate to
goods;2 1 however, nothing in the language of the General Agree-
ment expressly excludes services 2'
In November 1985, GATT member nations agreed to convene
a preparatory committee to "chart the course of a new round, of
world trade talks" scheduled for the fall of 1987213 The con-
tracting parties met in Punta del Este, Uruguay, September 15-20,
1986 where they proposed adoption of the Ministerial Declaration
on the Uruguay Round of the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions on goods and services (The Uruguay Round).2 14 The Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations (MTNs) will be concluded within four
years and involve two subsidiary negotiating groups. Part I will re-
late to negotiations on trade in goods;21 4 Part II will relate to nego-
tiations on trade in services210 From this, it would appear that
210. Id. at 285. Nations supporting the United States' efforts toward expansion in 1982
included Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, and to a lesser extent, Switzerland, Netherlands,
Norway, Finland, Canada, Japan and Australia. Nations opposed were France, Italy and
most of the developing countries, especially India and Brazil. Seidmen, supra note 4, at 5.
21L Expanding the Scope of GATT, supra note 185, at 291.
212. id.
213. Seidman, supra note 4, at 53.
214. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, done Sept. 20, 1986, 25 LL.M. 1623 (1986).
215. The Ministerial Declaration for Part I contains the following statement of purpose:
The Contracting Parties meeting at Ministerial level
Determined to halt and reverse protectionism and to remove distortions to trade
Determined also to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives of
the GATT
Determined also to develop a more open, viable and durable multilateral trading
system
Convinced that such action would promote growth and development
Mindful of the negative effects of prolonged financial and monetary instability
in the world economy, the indebtedness of a large number of less-developed con-
tracting parties, and considering the linkage between trade, money, finance and
development
Decide to enter into Multilateral Trade Negotiations on trade in goods within
the framework and under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.
Statement by the Chairman, Id. at 1624.
216. The Ministers also decided as part of the MTN to launch negotiations on trade in
services. Part II of the statement of purpose established that:
Negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a multilateral framework of Prin-
ciples and rules for trade in services, including elaboration of possible disciplines
for individual sectors, with a view to expansion of such trade .... Such frame-
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plans to expand the scope of the GATT General Agreement are
under way. If negotiations are fruitful, this may prove to be at
least one attractive approach for attacking Brazil's market reserve
policy.
5. Offer Trade Concessions
Although national security concerns originally justified Brazil-
ian protectionism in the informatics area, it is reported that eco-
nomic concerns ultimately "spurred the passage of the informatics
law." '2 17 In view of the recent economic setbacks in Brazil, it may
again be appropriate to reevaluate the strict market reserve policy
in an econjimic light. Until February 1987, Brazil was looked upon
by international bankers as a "model debtor nation. '21 8 Only one
year before, Brazilian officials had been bragging that Brazil, Latin
America's largest country, had "entered an era of zero inflation"
and that their price-freezing Cruzado Plan had brought thousands
of new consumers into the market, spurring a demand that "kept
industry humming at record levels." '2 19 When the Cruzado Plan
was introduced it was extremely well-received, and the popularity
of Brazilian President Jose Sarney increased enormously,220 but
economists now insist that the Plan was never fully imple-
mented. 21 The significant salary increases, combined with the
Plan's frozen prices, produced explosive demand and concomitant
widespread shortages that hurt Brazil's trade balance. This policy
ultimately caused a drop in the country's reserves and threatened
its ability to service its debt.2 2 Brazil attempted to take the neces-
sary therapeutic measures by unfreezing prices, but ultimately, the
work shall respect the policy objectives of national laws and regulations applying
to services and shall take into account the work of relevant international
organizations.
GATT procedures and practices ehall apply to these negotiations.
Statement by the Chairman, Id at 1627.
217. Recent Development, supra note 16, at 622.
218. Whitefield, The Politicians Have Run Out of Miracles, The Miami Herald, Mar.
23, 1987 (Business/Monday), at 41, Col.1.
219. Id.
220. Id. at col. 3.
221. Id. Brazilian economist, Lara Resende, explained that "(tjhe Cruzado Plan
shouldn't have been a stabilization program. Unfortunately it was never fully implemented.
What was done was simply a freezing of prices. After this, various fiscal and monetary mea-
sures were supposed to be taken. The government never implemented the orthodox part of
the plan." Id. at 41-2.
222. Id. at 41, coL 3.
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Cruzado Plan was "scrapped. 2 23
Contemporaneous with Brazil's economic woes, the U S.,
pressed by groups such as California Flower Growers, implemented
new trade policies of its own, establishing lower entry quotes and
higher tariffs at the U.S. border for many Latin American im-
ports.22 ' According to reports, most U.S. government officials and
legislators agree that Congress will pass a major trade bill in 1988
aimed at narrowing the $170 billion U.S. trade defieit. 22 Among
proposals currently being considered in both houses, one version
provides that "certain Brazilian imports would be subject to a 25
percent import duty unless [Brazil] reduces its trade surplus with
the United States and reduces its import restrictions on U.S. goods
and services" (emphasis added).2 ' Reportedly, Brazilian exports of
steel, textile goods, shoes, and corned beef would be likely
targets.2 7
With Brazil in the throes of rising inflation, it seems likely
that Brazil may be more receptive to suggestions for workable
compromises with an eye toward attracting investors and soothing
international banks. It is felt by some that the key to reducing the
burden of foreign debt lies in "freeing private citizens from stifling
rules and taxes and giving them the opportunity to attract capital,
produce goods and services, and stimulate economic growth."2 28
This is not meant to be a "quick fix" nor is it intended to be an
"overnight solution," but it is probably the only solution that will
223. Id.
224. In early February 1987, the U.S. government raised the entry duties for most Co-
lombian flowers by 40 percent. The California growers, who requested the increase, com-
plained that they were "being driven out of the business by Colombian firms subsidized by
the Colombian government." Colombia is not alone. Dominican Republic sugar growers, Ec-
uadorean shrimp farmers, and Brazilian orange juice makers, among others, are "up in arms
over what they say are growing obstacles to export their goods to the U.S. market." Oppen-
heimer, supra note 186, at col. 1.
225. Brazil, alone, is not being singled out. One version of the proposals being consid-
ered specifically mentions Japan, South Korea, and Brazil and is aimed at imposing new
tariffs on "selected imports from [several] countries that are running excessive trade sur-
pluses with the United States." Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Baker, U.S. Plan to Cut Latin Bank Debt Making Progress, The Miami Herald,
Mar. 23, 1987 (BusinessfMonday), at 51, col. L According to Treasury Secretary, James A.
Baker III, "across-the-board debt forgiveness would ultimately damage the global econ-
omy. . . ." Using this approach, commercial banks would "take losses that might weaken
confidence in worldwide financial stability" and also "frighten investors from productive
ventures." Id. at col. 2.
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work in the long run."2 9 According to the views of one international
business authority:
... many Latin American nations have developed world-class
industries, yet are "playing the Third World card" when asked
by the U.S. government to stop subsidizing their exports or to
open their markets to U.S. goods [and services].
For too long, countries like Mexico, Brazil and Argentina
have prided themselves on being newly industrialized countries,
.... It's about time that they begin playing by the big guys'
rules."'0
U.S. banks probably realized that they will have to make conces-
sions in order to find flexible alternative methods to solve Latin
American economic growth needs;23 1 the other side of the coin is
that Brazil, too, must seriously consider making concessions in the
area of a more compromising market reserve policy. Brazil is truly
"at the crossroads. 23 2 Some questions must soon be asked; some
choices may no longer be avoided.
V. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the GATT Multilateral Treaty Negotia-
tions may provide the best opportunity for opening up Brazil's
trade policies where computer software and services are concerned.
If the U.S. hopes to make any great strides toward development of
trade agreements in the information services sector, bilateral trade
agreements between the U.S. and Brazil may be no substitute for
the multilateral GATT. From the point of view of other potential
participants in any agreements reached -regarding computers and
software services, third parties would probably not merely accede
to rules negotiated by the U.S. and Brazil, but would want to par-
ticipate in the rule formulation process themselves.3 2
GATT negotiations in the area of trade in services may be
complicated by the fact that valuation of these services may not be
easy.234 Software is something incorporated in the computer hard-
229. Id at co]. 1.
230. Oppenheimer, supra note 186. at 29. col. 1 (quoting Jerry Haar, Florida Interna-
tional University professor of international business).
231. Oppenheimer, supra note 174, at 14, col 2.
232. Resnick, supra note 173, at 23, col. 2.
233. See supra note 8, at 98.
234. Id. at 35.
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ware itself; in these instances, the value of this type of software
can only be estimated.'-" If software is transported internationally
on disks or magnetic tape, tariffs will, presumably, be charged ac-
cording to the value of the physical medium, which only "contains"
the software but is not related to the value of the software itself. 8
Another area of possible complication in the continuing GATT
discussions concerns the "safeguards" issue.2 3 7 This area focuses on
conditions and criteria to be applied to the subject of traded ser-
vices. For example, any agreements reached should specify "the
circumstances under which action could be taken by one country
to limit imports of traded services from another, how long such
measures may last, whether compensation should be paid, and
what procedures should be established for consultation." '
Even though the GATT General Agreement was originally de-
veloped to regulate trade in "visible" goods, 3 9 rapid new develop-
ments in the services sector and the establishment of an interna-
tional industry of trade in "invisible" (services) makes it all the
more imperative that the GATT Multilateral Treaty Negotiations
Part II succeed in establishing guidelines of mutual cooperation in




237. Id. at 121.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 93.
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EDITOR'S UPDATE
BRAZIL'S INFORMATICS BARGAINING CHIP: PLAYING THE THIRD-
WORLD CARD
Threats of U.S. trade sanctions were frequent after Brazil
passed its 1984 "Informatics law." This law effectively barred for-
eign participation in large segments of the computer market.'
On June 30, 1987, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies ap-
proved a government-sponsored bill granting copyright protection
to both national and foreign software, appeasing what U.S. officials
described as an unfair trade practice.2 However, on September 22,
1987, Brazil's Secretariat Especial de Informatica (SEI) banned
imports of U.S. software, namely Microsoft Corporation's MS-DOS
program, because similar software, developed by the Brazilian
company, Scopus, was already available on the domestic market?
Alleging that it was losing between $50-$100 million, Microsoft
submitted a formal request to the U.S. government for the imposi-
tion of sanctions. 4
On November 14, 1987, President Reagan announced that he
would impose punitive tariffs covering more than $100 million
worth of Brazilian imports in retaliation for Brazilian curbs on
American computer and software products." The announcement
was significant due to the fact that this was only the second time
that the U.S. has imposed trade sanctions. The first time involved
semiconductors imported from Japan. The sanctions were im-
posed in reaction to unfair trade practices and were aimed at regu-
lations that effectively barred foreign participation in Brazil's com-
puter market. The impetus for this action was the September
denial by the Brazilian government of a license sought by six Bra-
zilian computer hardware companies to use Microsoft's MS-DOS
software system.




5. Farnsworth, Reagan Imposes Punitive Tariffs Against Brazil, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14,
19B7 at 1, col. I [hereinafter Reagan Imposesi.
6. Fields, U.S. Slaps Brazil with Sanctions in Trade Dispute, The Miami Herald, Nov.
14, 1987, at 4D, Col. 1.
7. Reagan Imposes, supra note 5, at 18, col. 4.
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Next, on November 18, 1987, a new version of the software law
was approved by the Brazilian Senate.8 The new version was more
flexible and liberal in its "similarity test" definitions than the
SET's Normative Act 22 (which guided the SET's decision to deny
Microsoft the permit to sell the MS-DOS in Brazil)." The two most
significant changes in the measure concerned first, the criteria for
granting a license to foreign-made software and second, the estab-
lishment of ad valorem duties to be paid on software developed
abroad and imported for use in Brazil.1 These two changes may be
summarized as follows:
(1) The Senate's measure reduced the SET's discretion to deny
a license for software developed abroad. Under Article 10 of the
Senate compromise, foreign-made software will be denied a license
provided there is similar Brazilian software that: a) is a functional
equivalent, independently and originally developed in Brazil; b) is
made by a firm that is able to supply satisfactory support to the
product's users; c) can be delivered to users in satisfactory time; d)
meets national standards and has a higher price than the foreign
brand only when the additional value of ad valorem duties are
taken into account; and e) can execute substantially the same func-
tions, considering the types of application and the characteristics
of the national market.
(2) Article 17 of the Senate text says that a user of foreign
software has to pay a "contribution quota" of up to 200% of the
software's value for the next five years. This fee would be reduced
to 150% after 1992 and then to 100% after 1997. This, in effect,
meant that the Brazilian users would be paying double the interna-
tional price for foreign software by 1998.
The Senate version also limited to 120 days the time the SET
would have to license or to ban foreign software. Another aspect of
the measure is that it provided for penalties of six months to two
years in jail, plus fines, for marketing or using any foreign software
without a license.'
The Brazilian House of Representatives voted in early Decem-
ber, 1987, to adopt the Senate's version of the software law. Once
8. Brazilian Informatics Council Meetings May Overturn Microsoft License Denial




11. Id. at 1452.
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approved, the measure was sent to President Jose Sarney to be
signed. 2 President Sarney approved the software law but he used
his perogative to veto portions of the legislation that would have
imposed a 200% ad valorem fee on all foreign software sold in Bra-
zil." In fact, he deleted thirteen parts of the legislation, all having
to do with the establishment of the contribution fee that users
would have to pay to buy licensed foreign software. This veto effec-
tively allowed greater access of foreign software to the Brazilian
Market.' 4 The provision approved by Congress regarding the "sub-
stantial similarity" test for licensing software in Brazil, which is
more liberal than the SEI's Normative Act 22, was left unchanged.
Finally, Brazil's National Council on Informatics and Automa-
tion (CONIN), which began its meetings on November 25, 1987,
ultimately reversed the SEI's September 22nd decision to deny
Microsoft the right to sell its MS-DOS software in Brazil. Re-
cently, in February, 1988, CONIN authorized the sale in Brazil of
the MS-DOS program, developed by the Microsoft Corporation.15
Reinforcing this Brazilian desire to avoid future conflict with the
U.S. computer manufacturers, the Brazilian government later pro-
hibited the commercialization of a model from a Brazilian firm,
Unitron, after repeated complaints by the Apple Corporation that
the Unitron model was an unauthorized clone of its own models.'
12. Government Seeks To Avert U.S. Sanctions, Latin Am. Regional Rep. Brazil, Jan.
7, 1988, at 6, col. 1.
13. Brazil's President Sarney Vetoes 200 Percent Ad Valorem Fee on New Software
Legislation, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), Jan. 6, 1988, at 18.
14. Id.
15. Software Imports Authorized, Latin Am. Regional Rep- Brazil, Feb. 11, 1988.
16. SEI Cancels Commercial License For Brazilian Macintosh Clone, Brazil Watch,
Apr. 4-18, 1988, at 9. For background on this dispute between Apple and Unitron, see Presi-
dential Concern About Foreign Debt Agreement Could Nix License for Macintosh Clone,
Brazil Watch, Mar. 7-21, 1988, at 9; Bitter Dispute Between Apple Computer, Inc. and
Brazilian Clone-Maker May Have Led to Downtown Sao Paulo Kidnapping, Brazil Watch,




Law nr. 7.646 of December 18, 1987.
Enacts provisions dealing with the protection of intellectual
property upon computer programs and their marketing in Bra-
zil, and enacts other provisions.
The President of the Republic makes known that the National
Congress decrees and he sanctions the following law:
TITLE I
Preliminary Provisions
ART. 1. The production and marketing of computer programs
both of foreign or local origin, are free in the Country, and the
holders of the respective rights are assured full protection, under
the conditions laid down by law.
Sole Paragraph - Computer program is the expression of an
organized set of instructions, in natural or code language, con-
tained in a physical support of any nature, for necessary use in
automatic machines for information treatment, devices, peripheral
instruments or equipment, based on digital technique, to make
them operate in determinate manner and for determinate
purposes.
ART. 2. The protection regime for intellectual property upon
computer programs is the system enacted through Law 5.988, of
December 14, 1973, with the modifications established by this law
in consideration of the particular features inherent to computer
programs.
TITLE II
Protection to Author Rights
ART. 3. Protection of rights relating to computer programs is
assured for a period of 25 (twenty-five) years, as from the release
of same in any country.
First Paragraph- The protection to the rights contemplated in
the law will not depend upon registration or enrollment with the
Special Secretariat of Informatics- SEI.
Second Paragraph- The rights conferred by this law to foreign
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parties, domiciled abroad, are assured provided that the country of
origin of the the program also grants to both Brazilians and for-
eigners domiciled in Brazil equivalent rights, both in extent and
duration, to those provided for in the head of this article.
ART. 4. The computer programs may at their author's discre-
tion be registered at an agency to be appointed by the National
Copyright Council (CNDA) governed by Law nr. 5.988 of Decem-
ber 14, 1973 and reorganized by Decree nr. 84.252 of July 28, 1979.
First Paragraph - The owner of the author right shall submit
to the agency appointed by the CNDA, upon filing the registration
request, portions of the program and other data considered suffi-
cient to characterize the independent creation and the identity of
the computer program.
Second Paragraph - The creator of a program, in order to
identify himself/herself as the owner of the author right, may use
his/her full or abridged civil name, and even his/her initials, as
provided for in article 12 of Law 5.988 of December 14, 1973.
Third Paragraph - The information upon which the registra-
tion is based is of a secret nature, and cannot be disclosed, except
under court order or at the request of the owner himself/herself.
ART. 5. Except when otherwise agreed, the rights relating to
computer programs developed and elaborated during the term of
an agreement or of a statutory bond expressly meant for research
and development, or in which the activity of the employee, servant
or supplier of services is foreseen, or also, when it originates from
the nature itself of the contracted job, shall belong exclusively to
the employer or contractor of services.
First Paragraph - Except when otherwise agreed, the compen-
sation for work or service rendered shall be limited to the remuner-
ation or salary agreed upon.
Second Paragraph - The rights attached to a computer pro-
gram generated without relation to the labor contract, statutory
bond or services agreement, and without use of resources, technical
information, materials, facilities or equipment of the employer or
contractor of services, shall belong exclusively to the employee, ser-
vant or supplier of services.
ART. 6. When provided for in an agreement entered into be-
tween the parties, the rights to the technological changes and deri-
rates will belong to the authorized person who makes same and
who will exercise such rights autonomously.
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ART. 7. The following acts will not constitute an offense to au-
thor rights in computer programs:
I. The reproduction of a lawfully acquired copy, provided that
it is essential for the proper use of the program;
II. The partial quotation, for didactic purposes, provided the
the author and the program to which the quotation refers are
identified;
III. The occurrence of a likeness of a program to a pre-existing
program, if such likeness results from functional features of its ap-
plication, from the compliance with legal provisions or regulations
or with technical rules, or from limited alternative forms for its
expression;
IV. The integration of a program, its essential features being
maintained, to an application or operational body, technically in-
dispensable to the user's needs, provided the same is used solely by
whomever effected such integration.
TIm-E III
Enrollment
ART. 8. The previous enrollment of the program or set of pro-
grams with the Special Secretariat of Informatics (SEI) is
mandatory to permit the marketing referred to in article 1 of this
Law, and said Secretariat will classify same into different catego-
ries, according to whether they are developed locally or abroad,
whether in an association of foreign and national companies or not,
being national companies defined as set forth in article 12 of Law
nr. 7.232 of October 29, 1984 and article 1 of Decree-Law nr. 2.203
of December 27, 1984.
First Paragraph - Where the protection of author rights is con-
cerned, no differences are established among the categories re-
ferred to in the head of this article; such categories will be diversi-
fied for the following purposes: public funds financings, tax
benefits, marketing and profit remittance, or payment of rights to
foreign-domiciled holders thereof, as applicable.
Second Paragraph - The enrollment provided for in this arti-
cle, and the approval of the acts and contracts referred to in this
Law, by the Special Secretariat of Informatics, shall be condi-
tioned for purposes of programs developed by non-Brazilian com-
panies, to the determination of nonexistence of similar computer
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programs developed in Brazil by a national company.
Third Paragraph - Further to the provisions established in the
head of this Article, the enrollment referred to in this Law is a
prior and essential condition to:
I. the validity and enforceability of any legal transaction relat-
ing to programs;
H. the production of tax and exchange effects, and the legiti-
macy of corresponding payments, credits or remittances, as the
case may be, without prejudice to other requirement and condi-
tions established by law.
ART. 9. The enrollment, for the purposes and effects contem-
plated in the preceding article, will be valid for a minimum period
of 3 (three) years and will be automatically renewed, by the Spe-
cial Secretariat of Informatics-SEI, subject to the provisions of the
second paragraph of said article.
Sole Paragraph - Against a decision granting or denying en-
rollment request, an appeal may be filed, with the National In-
formatics and Automation Council - CONIN the provisions of the
internal By-Laws of this Council being obeyed.
ART. 10. For the purposes of this Law, a computer program
will be considered similar to another, when the following condi-
tions are complied with:
a) It is functionally equivalent, considering that:
L it must be original and independently developed.
IM it must have substantially, the same performance char-
acteristics, considering the purpose of its application.
III. it must operate in similar equipment and in similar
processing environment.
b) The national established standards are observed, whenever
applicable.
c) (vetoed).
d) it executes, substantially, the same functions, considering
the purpose of its application, and the characteristics of the na-
tional market.
ART. 11. The Special Secretariat of Informatics shall have a
term of one hundred and twenty (120) days counted as of the date




ART. 12. Any company failing to fit under the definition of
national company will have its enrollment request granted exclu-
sively for computer programs applicable to equipment, made in
Brazil or abroad, marketed in Brazil by a company fitting under
such same category.
ART. 13. The enrollment of a computer program will be
deemed null and void, at any time:
I. by a final judicial decision;
II. by an administrative act, whenever it is evidenced that the
information submitted by the interested party to back up the ap-
plication for enrollment, is not true.
ART. 14. The Special Secretariat of Informatics may charge
fees for the -enrollment services, according to an appropriate list of




ART. 15. The Special Fund of Informatics and Automation,
governed by Law nr. 7.232 of October 29, 1984, shall be earmarked
for financing of the following programs:
a) research and development of informatics and automation
technology;
b) training of human resources in the informatics area;
c) furnishing of equipment to Informatics Research Centers
with priority to Federal and State Universities;
d) capitalization of Technology and Informatics Centers cre-
ated in accordance with the policies of the National Informatics
and Automation Plan (PLANIN).
Sole Paragraph - The Special Fund of Informatics and Auto-
mation shall be formed of:
a) budget allowances;
b) contribution quotas;












ART. 23. The physical supports of the computer programs and
respective packages as well as the agreements in connection
thereto shall indicate in a manner clearly readable by the user, the
enrollment number, (vetoed) and the technical validity term of the
commercialized version.
ART. 24. During the technical validity term of the respective
version, the holder of the commercialization rights of computer
programs, shall be required to:
I. disclose without additional payment, the corrections of any
mistakes.
IL guarantee to the respective consumers the supply of com-
plementary technical services, for the adequate functioning of the
computer program, the specifications of the program and the par-
ticulars of the consumer being considered.
ART. 25. During the technical validity term, dealt with in the
preceding articles, the holder of rights over computer programs
may not withdraw them from the market without fair indemnifica-
tion for any damage which may be caused to third parties.
ART. 26. The holder of rights over computer programs and
their commercialization, shall be responsible towards consumers
for adequate technical quality, as well as for the quality of fixation
or recording of the same, in their respective physical supports, and
regressive legal action may be filed against the prior holders of
such rights.
ART. 27. The economic exploitation of computer programs in
the Country shall be governed by assignment or license agreements
freely agreed upon by the parties. These agreements shall deter-
mine the responsibility for the payment of taxes and charges due
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in the Country as a result thereof.
Sole Paragraph - The clauses which stipulate the following
shall be null:
a) determine exclusivity;
b) limit the production, distribution and commercialization;
c) hold any of the contracting parties, harmless from any re-
sponsibility in connection with any legal action sought by third
parties as a result of malfunctions, defects or violation of
copyrights.
ART. 28. Except as provided for in article 12 hereof, the mar-
keting of computer programs will be only permitted to national
companies which must enter into license or assignment agreements
with non-national suppliers, as provided for in this Law.
Sole Paragraph - The approval by the relevant agencies of the
Executive Power, of those acts and contracts relating to marketing
of computer programs of foreign origin is a prior and essential
condition:
a) to permit the enrollment of the program;
b) to permit tax deductibility, subject to the rules provided for
in specific legislation;
c) to allow the remittance abroad of the sums payable, in ac-
cordance with this law and other applicable legal provisions.
ART. 29. Approval and recording will only be granted to those
acts or contracts, relating to foreign-origin programs, which estab-
lish a compensation to the author or assignee residing or domiciled
abroad, on the basis of a fixed price per copy and associated tech-
nical documentation, which cannot exceed the international aver-
age value practiced in the distribution of the same product, and no
payment calculated on the basis of production, revenue or profits
earned by the assignee or user, will be permitted.
First Paragraph - Non-national companies are excluded from
the permission granted in this article, but as a result of the mar-
keting permitted by article 12 of this Law such companies will be
allowed to remit foreign currency as contemplated in the provi-
sions and according to the limitations set forth by Law nr. 4.131 of
September 3, 1962 and subsequent legislation.
Second Paragraph - The regular tax purposes invoice ("Nota
Fiscal") issued by the holder of the corresponding rights or his le-
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gal representatives, which evidences the commercialization of com-
puter programs of foreign origin, will be sufficient to permit the
payments provided for in the head of this article.
TITLE VI
General Provisions
ART. 30. The importation or interning, as the case may be, of
a single copy of a computer program destined for exclusive uses by
the end-user, shall be permitted. (vetoed)
ART. 31. In the event of transfer of technology of a computer
program, the recordation of the agreement by the National Insti-
tute of Industrial Property (INPI) will be mandatory, including for
the purposes of payment and deductibility of the respective remu-
neration, and for the other effects contemplated in this Law.
Sole Paragraph - The recordation referred to in this article
will be granted when no national technical capability exists, and
will be conditioned to the supply by the supplier of the technology
to the recipient thereof, of the full documentation, particularly of
the commented source-code, descriptive memoranda functional
and internal specifications, diagrams, flow-charts and other re-
quired technical data necessary for the assimilation of the
technology.
ART. 32. For the purposes of calculating the amount of taxable
profit subject to Income Tax, companies may deduct as operating
expenses up to the double of the amount spent with the acquisi-
tion of computer programs when such companies are the first users
thereof and provided that said programs are considered as being of
relevant interest, the provisions of articles 15 and 19 of Law 7.232
of October 29, 1984 being observed.
First Paragraph - Concurrently, as a form of incentive,the util-
ization of computer programs developed in the country by private
national companies shall be taken into account for purposes of
granting the incentives provided for in article 13 of Law 7.232 of
October 29, 1984 as well as for financing with public resources.
Second Paragraph - The entities and bodies of the direct or
indirect public administration, foundations instituted or main-
tained by the Government, and other entities under direct or indi-
rect control of the Government shall give preference, under same
conditions, to the utilization of computer programs developed in
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the country by national private companies, in accordance with the
provisions of article 11 of Law 7.232 of October 29, 1984.
Third Paragraph - The participation of the State in the com-
mercialization of computer programs shall comply with the provi-
sions of item IL of Article 2 of Law 7.232 of October 29, 1984.
ART. 33. The actions aimed at cancelling a registration or en-
rollment, the dockets and proceedings of which shall be kept se-
cret, may be filed by any interested party or by the Federal
Government.
ART. 34. The nullity of the registration may be alleged as a
defense argument in civil or criminal suits relating to violation of
copyrights on computer programs.
TITLE VII
Sanctions and Penalties
ART. 35. Infringements to copyrights in computer programs
will have the following:
Penalty-confinement, from six (6) months to two (2) years,
plus fine.
ART. 36 (vetoed).
ART. 37. Importation, display, or keeping in storage, for mar-
keting purposes foreign-origin computer programs which are not
enrolled, will subject the infringer to:
Penalty-confinement, from one (1) to four (4) years, plus fine.
Sole Paragraph - The provisions herein contained are not ap-
plicable for programs interned solely for demonstration purposes
or market assessment in fairs or congresses, of a technical, scien-
tific or industrial nature.
ART. 38. In the offense provided for in article 35 (vetoed)
hereof, the criminal action shall be filed through a complaint, ex-
cept when committed to the detriment of the Union, of a State, the
Federal District, a Municipality, an autonomous agency, a public
company, a partially State owned company, or a foundation under
Ministry supervision.
Sole Paragraph - In the offense contemplated in article 35 of
this Law, the criminal action and the preliminary search and
seizure injunction will be preceded by an inspection, and the judge
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may order the seizure of any copies produced or marketed in viola-
tion of copyrights, the versions and derivatives of same, in the pos-
session of the infringer or any party displaying, keeping in storage,
reproducing or marketing same.
ART. 39. Independently from criminal suit, the damaged party
may file a suit to prohibit infringer from continuing to perform the
infringing action, by means of a financial penalty for infringement
of the order (as provided for in Article 287 of the Civil Procedure
Code).
First Paragraph - The action to prevent the practice of an ac-
tion may be cumulative with a suit to recover losses and damages
caused by the infringement.
Second Paragraph - The civil suit filed on the basis of an in-
fringement of rights relating to intellectual property in computer
programs will be judged through secret proceedings (i.e. will not be
available to review by third parties).
Third Paragraph - In civil proceedings, the injunction for
search and seizure will comply with the provisions contained in the
sole paragraph of article 38 hereof.
Fourth Paragraph - The judge may grant a preliminary injunc-
tion prohibiting the infringer from practicing the incriminating act,
as provided for in the beginning of this article irrespective of a
preparatory injunction.
Fifth Paragraph - Any party applying for and promoting the
injunctions provided for in this article and in the preceding article,
when acting in bad faith or .merely for emulation sake, caprice or
gross error, will be liable for losses and damages, as provided for in
articles 16, 17 and 18 of the Civil Procedure Code.
TITLE VIII
Statute of Limitation
ART. 40. The statute of limitation to file a civil suit for offenses
against author's patrimonial rights is five years.
ART. 41. The same statute of limitation is applicable to any
suits claiming default under resulting obligations, such period to
be counted as from the date:
a) which constitutes the final technical validity term of the
marketed release of the software;
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b) of expiry of the the warranty, in the case of a custom made
program;
c) of the license for use of the computer program.
TITLE DC
Final Provisions
ART. 42. This Law will become effective on the date of its
publication.
Sole Paragraph - The Executive Power shall issue the regula-
tion to this Law in a one hundred and twenty (120) day term,
counted as of the publication of this Law.
ART. 43. All provisions to the contrary are hereby revoked.
Brasilia, on December 18, 1987
166th of Independence and 99th of the Republic
Jose Sarney
Luiz Henrique da Silveira
Note: This Law was published in the Official Gazette
("Diario Oficial da Uniao") on December 22, 1987.
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